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DISQUISITION ON THE NEED FOR A NEW
MODEL FOR CRIMINAL SANCTIONING

SYSTEMS*
M. KAY HARmS**
The time is ripe for a major restructuring of our criminal sanctioning systems. Pressures for change are arising from many
sources. As crime rates continue to rise and public fear of crime
grows apace, thoughtful persons from many walks of life are more
strongly articulating the need to find a different method of dealing
with those convicted of violating the criminal law. The criminal
prosecutions and dispositions arising from Watergate and related
cases have brought many of the issues of unequal justice into the
thoughts of American citizens. Proposals for criminal and penal
code revision await action in legislatures throughout the country.
Judges find a growing percentage of their workload being devoted
to hearing and attempting to resolve complaints from convicted
offenders concerning the nature of their sentences, the conditions
of their confinement, and the procedures by which their lives are
governed.
This article will highlight some of the major problems, sources
of confusion, and matters of controversy that surround present
sanctioning practices. The subject areas to be addressed include
sentencing discretion, lack of clarity or consensus regarding the
purposes to be served in imposing criminal sanctions, dispartity in
sentencing, the acceptability of current sanctions by humanitarian
and legal standards, and the parole release function as a part of
sentencing. A number of officers, institutions, and forces impinge
upon or influence the nature and duration of sanctions. This article
will focus primarily on the legislature, judiciary, and paroling authorities as they impact on the sanctioning process, excluding discussion of a number of other critical actors.' The problems that will
*Although an earlier version of this article was prepared for the ABA's Com-

mission on Correctional Facilities and Services, the views expressed herein are the
author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the American Bar Association or any

component thereof.
**B.A., University of Kansas, 1969; A.M., University of Chicago, 1971. Ms.
Harris is currently Assistant Director, American Bar Association, Resource Center

on Correctional Law and Legal Services.
IFor a compact overview of the importance of the discretionary decisions left
to police, prosecutors, magistrates or trial judges, and jurors in regard to arrest,
indictment, pre-trial diversion, pre-trial release or detention, and trial, see Motley,
"Law and Order"andthe CriminalJustice System, 53 J. Cium. L. &C. 259 (1973).
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be highlighted in these three areas reflect flaws that are endemic
throughout the criminal justice process. The article will also summarize the major types of reform that have been suggested in the
last ten or fifteen years.
This review of the problems that characterize present sanctioning practices and of proposed remedies is not intended to be
fully exhaustive of the subjects raised. Rather, the intent is to
reiterate the flaws in the system, already catalogued in much
greater detail elsewhere, as a prelude to addressing the inadequacy
of most of the existing proposals for change. Many of our present
sanctioning practices are performed in ways, or result in ends, that
are unlawful, unjust, ineffective, and inhumane. Decisions regarding where and how thousands of persons may spend years of their
lives are left to individuals whose discretion is unguided by clear
objectives and virtually unchecked by procedural requirements or
further review. In view of the awesome power embodied in sanctioning decisions and their critical impact on American citizens,
the current state of the criminal sanctioning process is appalling.
Complete restructuring of our sanctioning practices is necessary,
requiring a reconceptualization of both the purposes that a criminal sanctioning system should be designed to serve and the most
sensible practices for achieving the desired goals. Social change
seldom arises simply from presentation of facts showing that the
status quo is ineffective. This may be a necessary condition for
change, but it is not a sufficient one. What is needed is a vision of
a new way-a vision that is compelling enough to attract sufficient
number of adherents to achieve its implementation. This article is
designed to assemble the major arguments concerning why a new
model for criminal sanctioning is needed and to offer some directions such a model might follow.
I.

SENTENCING DISCRETION

The formal model of the criminal justice process assigns to the
legislative branch the power and responsibility to establish and
declare the public policy for dealing with convicted law violators-the ends sought and the means allowed. In practice, however, legislatures have failed to provide a coherent sentencing policy. Statutes provided little guidance in terms of what the sentencing courts are expected to accomplish through the imposition of a
criminal sanction. The law authorizing various sentencing alternatives is chaotic. Penal codes are silent or vague as to the criteria
to be used in determing specific sentences.
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Such legislative abdication of fundamental responsibilities
concerning the sentencing process forces sentencing judges to decide the purpose and the manner that state power over convicted
offenders will be exercised. Each time a criminal sanction is imposed, the sentencing judge must decide the purposes to be served,
the available sentencing options to be chosen, and the criteria to
be taken into account.
It appears safe to say that judges have not been any more
successful than legislators, philosophers, or the general public in
resolving the long-standing debates regarding the proper purpose
or purposes of criminal sanctions. In the United States today
judges appear to be predominantly utilitarian and forward-looking
in the sentences they impose. They are committed to the social
goals of "protecting society" or reducing the likelihood of future
crime on the part of both particular offenders and the general
public. Thus, they see their role as maximizing by their sentences
the purposes of individual and general deterrence, incapacitation,
and reformation. At the same time, concern remains with limiting
the nature or length of sanctions by considerations of the offender's
"just desserts." There is notable confusion as to how all of the
purposes seen as proper can be reconciled with each other and
achieved.
The results of an exhaustive sentencing study, even though
conducted in Canada, are suggestive of the variations judges reveal
in weighing the divers purposes in imposing sentences. 2 Seventyone magistrates were asked to indicate how much importance they
attached to each of the classical purposes of sentencing: reformation, general deterrence, individual deterrence, incapacitation,
and punishment. The results indicated that while reformation was
rated highest among the group, different magistrates attached significantly different degrees of importance to the various purposes
and few completely ruled out any of the classical purposes of sentencing.' The researcher concluded that "[m]arked inconsistency
in the principles of sentencing [was] thus revealed." 4 In addition
to simply asking the magistrates to rate the importance of the
varying purposes in the abstract, they were asked to score sheets
indicating their purposes each time they sentenced. The results
indicated that while tending to give verbal support to the purpose
J.

HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A

HuimN

PROCESS

(1971).

Id. at 70-73.
Id. at 70.
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of reformation, the magistrates' actual sentencing seemed to be
more closely tied to the purposes of retributive punishment and
individual deterrence.'
Sentencing judges are also given considerable discretion in
selecting a sanction to serve the purposes they see as primary.
Although some statutes provide mandatory terms, in most cases
judges must decide among a number of options. They may impose
a fine, at least for certain offenses, and within prescribed limits
may use their discretion regarding amount and manner of payment. They may sentence probation for most offenses. They may
suspend the sentence, with or without special conditions, and they
may commit to an institution for a term within prescribed limits.
Except in some states,' sentences imposed within legal limits are
ordinarily not reviewable by higher courts.
This list of the general options available to sentencing judges
does not begin to exhaust the choices that must be explored each
time an offender is sentenced. In the United States federal district
courts, for example, there are three major types of statutory sentencing procedures available: the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act, the Federal Youth Corrections Act, and the regular and indeterminate sentence designated for defendants prosecuted as
adults.7 Using only the latter category for illustrative purposes,
federal sentencing statutes for adults include the options of fine,
imprisonment, probation with its various types of sub-groups
(immediate probation, split sentence, delayed probation, and proId. at 288-91.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (Supp. 1972); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2144 (1962); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (Deering 1971);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-509 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-194
(1960), §§ 51-195 to -196 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 641-24 (1968); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2821 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 615(b) (Smith-Hurd 1968); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-2321 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 793.18 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-3605 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2141 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 17, § 645JA (Supp. 1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 28A (Supp. 1974); Mo.
R. CaiM. P. 27.04, 27.05, 27.06; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2501 to -2504 (1947);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308 (1965); State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. 414, 170 A.2d
830 (App. Div. 1961); N.Y. CODE CRaM. PRO. § 470.15 (McKinney 1971); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2953.07 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1066 (1958); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 138.050 (1973); PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 211.504 (Cure. Supp. 1974); Brooks v.
State, 187 Tenn. 361, 215 S.W.2d 785 (1948); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 251.17 (1971). See

also Criminal Sentencing: An Overview of Proceduresand Alternatives, 45 Miss.
L.J. 782 (1974).

1 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 1971, at 29 (1973).
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bation without supervision), and imprisonment or probation plus
a fine.' In addition, deportation may be ordered following conviction in the case of an alien; sentence may be suspended; or the
court may fix the maximum sentence allowable by law and order
the offender committed for a period of study and observation before being returned to the court for affirmation or alteration of the
original sentence.'
Adults who are sentenced to imprisonment are further divided
into groups that indicate when they will be eligible for release from
incarceration. Most sentences to imprisonment are described as
"regular." The sentence is for a definite term within statutory
limits, with parole eligibility set at one-third of the maximum
sentence. The imprisonment group also includes adults receiving
indeterminate sentences whereby the court sets a maximum term
and may or may not fix a minimum term. When the minimum
term is set by the court under federal law, the Board of Parole may
consider release on parole after the minimum term has been
served. When no minimum is set by the court under federal law,
the Board of Parole may consider release on parole at any time."0
As an additional option, adult offenders may be sentenced
under Title II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966.
These commitments are made to the Attorney General for an indeterminate period of ten years. Another category of sentences involving imprisonment are those referred to as mixed sentences.
Defendants so sentenced have not only a term of imprisonment to
complete, but also a term of probation following completion of the
term of imprisonment or any portion of the term that is served
under supervision in the community on parole."
The probation statute, Title 18, United States Code, Section
3651, provides four classifications to describe types of probation.
"Immediate probation" occurs when the court places the defendant on probation without any intervening imprisonment. A "split
sentence" refers to a term of imprisonment not to exceed six
months combined with a probation term of up to five years. "Delayed probation" takes place when persons are serving previous
federal or state sentences and must therefore be given a postponement before they can begin serving their new probation term. This
Id. at 33, 34.
Id. at 31.
10

Id. at 33.

Id. at 34.
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type of sentence is similar to a mixed sentence, except that the
probation term imposed usually arises from a separate and completely unconnected conviction. Finally, some individuals may be
designated to serve a term of "probation without supervison."' 2
These examples are indicative of the complex variety of alternatives facing a sentencing judge. Viewed from another perspective, however, it can be argued that available sentencing alternatives are all too few, if quality, rather than quantity, is used as a
yardstick. Judicial decisions today are more involved with length,
definiteness, and choice between probation or incarceration than
with a variety of kinds of sanctions. While statutes in some jurisdictions are beginning to allow sentencing to community facilities
("half-way in" houses), day-care programs, or community service
obligations, sanctions such as week-end jail sentences have been
authorized for many years, and they are seldom used. Judges as a
rule continue to limit themselves to the far from perfect standbys
of incarceration and probation.
In trying to choose among the sentencing options open to
them, the sentencing judge must decide the factors relating to the
offense and the offender that willbe taken into account. Some idea
of the volume and nature of information the judge is expected to
consider can be derived from examining suggested standards for
the contents of presentence investigation reports. For example, the
Model Sentencing Act provides, in part, that whenever an investigation is required:
the probation officer shall promptly Inquire into the characteristics, circumstances, needs, and potentialities of the defendant; his criminal record and social history; the circumstances of the offense; the time the defendant has been in detention;
and the harm to the victim, his immediate family, and the
community. ....
.1

After being presented with this information, judges must then
decide the questions they will try to answer with it, that is, the
criteria that will be used in selecting the sanction. In trying to
assimilate and evaluate the material provided in the presentence
reports, judges often look to the probation staff who have collected
the information to suggest how it should be put to use in arriving
12

Id.

11THE

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT

§ 3 (2d ed. 1972).
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at a sentence.' 4 At a sentencing institute held in 1973 for federal
judges of the First and Second Circuits, a representative of the
United States Probation Service was asked to comment on the
factors that are taken into account in preparing presentence reports and recommendations. 5 In discussing the type of offenders
who "seldom merit probation" from the Probation Service's point
of view, the following factors were mentioned:
First of all, the non-addict drug seller who sells drugs for
money; the professional criminal whose life pattern has been
one of criminal activity; the educated white collar offender who
has taken advantage of people less fortunate and less educated
and who has been engaged in criminal activities largely because
of greed.
[Among those offenders not likely to respond to probation
even though their offenses were not serious and they have no
prior criminal record] there is the anti-establishment, antiauthority person who looks upon persons in authority with suspicion. Attempts to show kindness or understanding are looked
upon by them as weaknesses, and they take advantage of such
attempts at every opportunity.
Another type are those who believe that everything and
everyone has a price, that everything goes, and the only crime
is the crime of getting caught. Those persons with a psychotic
background or history are usually not suitable for probation.
Whether due to brain damage or personality makeup, the fact
that something might trigger off a psychotic episode makes
them poor probation risks.
We sometimes feel that those young people with no adult
criminal record but a long juvenile record of thefts and violence
make poor probation risks.
Another type are those persons who have little or no work
history."
It is evident from such comments that at least some practitioners in the field-and one could reasonably surmise that the
" Several studies have documented that sentencing judges follow the recommendation of probation officers with regard to sentence in upwards of eighty percent of the cases in which such reports are prepared, suggesting a major role for
probation officers in sanction selection. See, e.g., R. CARTER & L. WILKINS, Some

Factors in Sentencing Policy, in PROBATION AND PAROLE 140-44 (R. Carter & L.

Wilkins eds. 1970).
'" JUSTICE IN SENTENCING: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGSOF THE SENTENCING INSTITUTE FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CIRCUITS 20 (L. Orland &

H. Tyler eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE INSENTENCING].
,1Id. at 20-21.
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number is fairly large-find it not only plausible, but also desirable, that the sentencing decision should be based on an almost
infinite list of attitudes, tendencies, personality traits, beliefs, and
experiences that are to be somehow "diagnosed" or identified in
offenders or their histories quite apart from any more objective
aspects relating to the crime.
Even accepting that such "criteria" should play a part in
selection of sentence, there is little agreement, even among "experts," concerning the kind of information about offenders that is
useful for the purpose of sentencing or as to how it should be
utilized. The Canadian sentencing study'7 found that "there were
significant differences in the weight that different magistrates attached to different types or categories of information, particularly
in relation to the relative weights given to information concerning
the offender, the offense, and the criminal record."' 8 This study
concluded that "[m]agistrates chose certain kinds of information
selectively, interpreted this information selectively, ascribed importance to certain features of the case to the exclusion of others,
and selected among the various purposes in sentencing those which
were most consistent with their personal values and subjective
ends."'" This illustrates that the sanction may be based on any
factor the particular judge deems relevant-any factor, because
the judge does not have to justify or even explain the selection.
Judge Marvin Frankel has eloquently captured and criticized
the present status of procedures for making the critical determination as to the length and severity of sentence:
[O]ur practice in this country, of which I have complained
at length, is to leave that ultimate question to the wide, largely
unguided, unstandardized, usually unreviewable judgment of a
single official, the trial judge. This means, naturally, that intermediate questions as to factors tending to mitigate or to aggravate are also for that individual's exclusive judgment. We allow
him not merely to "weigh" the various elements that go into a
sentence. Prior to that we leave to his unfettered (and usually
unspoken) preferences the determination as to what factors
ought to be considered at all, and in what direction . ...
As I have urged already, there is no valid reason for leaving
to the individual judges their varying rules on what factors
ought to be material an to what effect. To say something is
,7 HOGARTH, supra note 2.

,Id. at 303.
, Id. at 378.
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"material" means it is legally significant. We know what is
legally significant by consulting the law. We do not allow each
judge to make up the law for himself on other questions. We
should not allow it with respect to sentencing.20
Our system of laws attaches elaborate, rigorous, and inviolate
procedural safeguards all the way through the criminal justice process to the point of conviction. When the question of sanctions is
reached, however, such considerations are abandoned almost entirely. It is interesting to note, for example, that the recently
adopted Federal Rules of Evidence for the United States Court and
Magistrates, established "to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined," 2'
expressly exclude sentencing proceedings from applicability.22 This
situation is all the more puzzling when one considers that courts
have increasingly recognized the necessity for procedural safeguards when a convicted offender's status after sentencing is significantly altered. Parole and probation revocation proceedings,
inter- and intra-state prison transfers, institutional disciplinary
proceedings, even intra-prison classification proceedings-in each,
it can be argued, the procedural safeguards are becoming more
rigorous than those that attach to the sentencing process.2
The fourteenth amendment guarantees to every person within
the jurisdiction of a state the equal protection of the laws. However, that guarantee has seldom been interpreted to mean that no
one shall be subjected to any greater or different punishment for
the same offense than that to which others are subjected. Only in
rare cases has this principle been so applied. One of the main
underpinnings of the Supreme Court's decision holding the death
penalty, as then implemented, unconstitutional 24 was the unequal
20 M. FRANKEL, CuMiNAL SENTENCEs 112 (1972).
21

FED. R. EVIDENCE 102.

22

FED. R. EVIDENCE 1101(a)(3).

-

In recent years the Supreme Court has dealt with each of these areas except
the last-in-prison classification procedures. See Gomes v. Travisono, 418 U.S. 910
(1974), vacating and remanding490 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1973) (interstate transfer
procedures); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary procedures); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation procedures);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation procedures); Newkirk
v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1214 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. 95 Sup. Ct. 172 (1974)
(intrastate transfer procedures).
24 Furman v,Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
23
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application of the penalty. The decisions barring imprisonment of
indigents who are unable to pay fines also reflect application of the
equal protection requirement.a Beyond these few exceptions, however, sentencing is governed more by people than by laws. Sentences are far from uniform and far grom the goal of equality. "The
courts have said that the right to equal treatment under the law
governs sentences; but it is almost never applied to them despite
numerous appeals by convicted offenders on exactly this ground,
often well supported factually.""6
The wisdom of continuing to rely on a sentencing system characterized by such vast discretion must be seriously questioned.
Instead of letting the judge decide an appropriate sentence, the law
could specify the exact penalty for each offense. Struggle for
Justice, a report prepared for the American Friends Service Committee," advocates just such an elimination of discretion, not only
in sentencing, but throughout the criminal process. While it acknowledges that cases of injustice would arise, the report argues
rather persuasively that, on the whole, the oppressed and nonconforming groups in our society would benefit.2
Against those who argue that it is not possible to formulate
sentencing law with sufficient precision to eliminate or greatly
reduce discretion, Struggle for Justice points to "the area of property, inheritance tax or business law or any area, for that matter,
in which the affairs of the more powerful and rich segments are
being regulated. In these areas the specificity of the law is extreme.
Little margin is left for discretion."" One can imagine the public
reaction that would attend a proposal that personal income tax
assessments be left to the discretion of local Internal Revenue
agents. Although there may be limits to the precision attainable
in the formulation of criminal penalties, current criminal statutes
do not begin to approach these limits. Sentencing statutes that
require considerable discretion in implementation do not well
serve either the legislature or the public. If legislators will not
reduce their desires to words, how are police or prosecutors or
judges or parole authorities to intuit what is wanted? Open-ended
21

(1970).

See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235

26

S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION VIII (2d ed. 1973).

'7

WORKING PARTY OF THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR

JUSTICE

(1971)

[hereinafter cited as STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE].

Id. at 124-44.
11Id. at 135.
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sentencing laws almost guarantee that the legislative mandate, if
indeed there is one, will be thwarted.
Those who continue to place reliance on discretion in sentencing argue that judges, parole boards, and correctional authorities
require a considerable degree of flexibility to tailor a disposition to
the unique and infinitely variable circumstances of each case. It
is asserted that the legislature is too far away in time and place
from any individual offender to foresee and weigh all of the significant variables. It is argued that only the sentencing judge, with the
defendant standing before him or her, can make the appropriate
choice of sentence. Nevertheless, if the significant variables surrounding individual offenders and specific offenses are so complex
and numerous as to prevent the legislature from indicating their
importance in terms of some explicit purpose or purposes, what is
the point of allowing them to influence the sentence? Even assuming that the judge in fact has available all of the relevant information, how is the individual judge to translate this data into a specific sentence?
The extent to which consistency is now found in dispositions
probably stems from the fact that relatively few variables are being
considered. This is suggested by findings that reveal that most
decision-makers are unable to assimilate and utilize more than
limited amounts of information." If only a few variables are actually being used in decision-making, why cannot those that are
deemed reasonable and proper be written into the law? This would
guarantee to all whatever leniency is bestowed on some. If legislators cannot find an unambiguous way to distinguish two actions
or variables, it may be better to treat them as if they were alike
than to leave the distinction for others. As Judge Sobeloff expressed several years ago, sentencing by judges is necessarily capricious, and it is thus unwise and unfair to repose in a single person,
without the possibility of appellate review, the grave responsibility
for such a vital function as sentencing. It is inconsistent with our
traditional notions of human freedom to give any one person such
a vast and unreviewable power over another, even after criminal
3
conviction. '
30See, e.g., Wilkins, Information Overload:Peace or War With the Computer,
64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 190-97 (1973). "[T]he human intellect, no matter how intelligent the individual, can process only very small quantities of information." Id. at
190. See also H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER & S. STRuRT, HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING: INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS IN CoMrPLEx SOCIAL SITUATIONS (1966).
1, Sobeloff, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 265-68 (1962).
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PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

There are deep and continuing conflicts about the proper philosophy upon which sentencing and dispositional decisions should
rest. Apparently unable to reach consensus on a philosophical base
for sentencing decisions, legislators tend to leave this determination to the discretion of criminal justice personnel on a case by case
basis. The muddle that surrounds various views concerning the
proper purposes of sentencing has been given respectability by a
declaration that our sentencing systems reflect the "integrative"
or "inclusive" approach to the philosophies of punishment. According to this view, there are a number of valid philosophies that
may properly be taken into account in the sentencing process.2 At
a recent sentencing institute for example, those in attendance were
advised by a judicial colleague to
[b]ear in mind that there is no single accepted objective of
sentencing. Wiser heads than ours over the centuries have
agreed that, to use the classical formulation, general deterrence,
special deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and protection of
society are properly purposes which the public asks sentencing
courts to keep in mind. Whatever your views may be of one or
more of these objectives, the judicial response on a given occasion may in large part depend upon the particular needs of the
public, the victim and the offender. This means that all legitimate objectives of sentence must be kept in mind at all times."
The degree of acceptaide bf the integrative approach to sentencing
is also illustrated by the statements of purpose set forth in three
major proposals for reform of the Federal Criminal Code.
The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws (the Brown Commission) stated the general purposes of its
proposed criminal code as follows:
[The provisions of this Code are intended, and shall be
construed to achieve the following objectives:
(a) to insure the public safety through (i) vindication of
public norms by the imposition of merited punishment; (ii) the
deterrent influence of the penalties hereinafter provided; (iii)
the rehabilitation of those convicted of violations of this Code;
For one of the earliest statements of this view see Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 248 (1949). See-also-J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 30708 (2d ed. 1960).
3 Tyler, Some Guideposts for the Compleat Sentencer, in JUSTICE IN
SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 201-02.
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and (iv) such confinement as may be necessary to prevent likely
recurrence of serious criminal behavior .... 3
Another proposed bill for reform of the criminal code listed the
following objectives:
This code seeks to promote the general security through
deterrence by giving due notice of the offenses and sanctions
prescribed by law, and where this proves ineffective, by the
rehabilitation of the corrigible offender or the appropriate incapacitation of the incorrigible offender.5
The proposal drafted by the Department of Justice, as its
proposed implementation of the Brown Commission report, listed
the following general purposes:
(a) to define conduct which indefensibly causes or threatens harm to those individuals or public interests for which federal protection is appropriate;
(b) to prescribe sanctions for engaging in such conduct
which will:
(1) assure just punishment for such conduct;
(2) deter such conduct;
(3) protect the public from persons who engage in such
conduct; and
(4) promote the correction and rehabilitation of person
who engage in such conduct .... 11
These general statements indicate either a belief that each
code can be all things to all persons, or that no one can decide what
purpose is to predominate or which purpose is to govern on a specific occasion. There is little guidance provided in any of these
proposals regarding how a sentencing judge is to balance these
complex and perhaps conflicting purposes in making individual
dispositions. Nor is there explanation of how the various sentencing alternatives, sentence lengths, or sentencing categories comprising the remainder of the proposals were developed in reference
to those purposes. Consideration of the respective merits of the
three proposals inevitably bogs down in discussions of whether the
allowable sentence for an offense category should be five or ten
years or whether a fine should be allowed up to ten thousand
dollars or one hundred thousand dollars. It is curious that the
11FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
LAWs (1971) pt. A, ch. 1, § 102.
3 S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-A (1973).
S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1973).
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debate regarding the proposals can even take place in the absence
of the more specific and rational conceptual framework that would
seem to be an essential guide to shaping specific provisions. Indeed, such legislative endorsement of a broad range of purposes
with virtually no further elaboration amounts to no legislative
guidance at all. As Judge Marvin Frankel notes, we continue to
suffer from unconscionable lawlessness in sentencing.
A Supreme Court opinion in 1958 made the obvious point
that the "apportionment of punishment," its "severity," "its
efficacy or its futility," are all peculiarly questions of legislative
policy. Fully agreeing that this ought to be so, I have been
saying at some length that the legislature has for too long abdicated this basic function. To begin at the elementary beginning,
we have an almost entire absence in the United States of legislative determinations-of "law"-governing the basic questions
as to the purposes and justifications of criminal sanctions.',
Of primary importance in any effort to bring rationality and
effectiveness to American sentencing is the development of a
model for a criminal sanctioning system that rests on a sound and
consistent philosophical base. A compelling vision of a new method
is needed. Construction of such a model will not be an easy task.
As indicated earlier, conflicts regarding the proper purpose or purposes of a criminal law system and of criminal sanctions are of long
standing and appear to resist resolution. Each of the existing philosophies has its stong advocates. Similarly, each has been subjected to eloquent criticism. The major positions on both sides in
respect to the classical formulations of sentencing purposes will be
briefly summarized below and an attempt made to suggest a basis
on which the conflicts might be settled. The nature of change
suggested will be elaborated in the concluding section of this
article.
A. Incapacitation
Incapacitation or preventive restraint as a justification for a
criminal sanction reflects the utilitarian desire to prevent, or reduce, the likelihood of future crime by restraining the person in
such a way as to make it much less likely that another offense will
be committed during the period of restraint. The form that this
restraint can take varies in severity and nature. The revocation of
a driver's license from one who has been convicted of drunken
3 M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 105 (1972).
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driving may be viewed as incapacitation as may the disbarment
of an attorney who has abused his or her trust. In common usage,
however, the term incapacitation tends to be equated with more
severe forms of restraint, particularly incarceration. The popularity of incapacitation as a justification for sanctions appears to
increase as the rate of crime, or fear of it, increases. The "common
sense" foundation of this justification is plain-let those who have
shown their propensity for offending against our laws be shut away
from us to prevent their doing so again.
The most elementary level of criticism of incapacitation as a
justification for criminal sanctions is directed toward its feasibility
or efficacy. Unless we are willing to execute or hold in solitary
confinement for life far greater numbers of persons than at present,
preventive confinement can only be considered efficacious in the
short term and then only if the danger to other prisoners during
confinement is disregarded. Given our historical preference for liberty and the dollar and social costs of execution or confinement for
life, it seems unlikely that this country will opt for general or
substantial increases in the use of either.
A second level of criticism of incapacitation can be characterized as a technological one. It is argued that our present ability to
predict future behavior is so inaccurate that any system of preventive confinement will mistakenly deprive many persons of their
liberty who would not in fact commit another crime if released.
Some of those who utilize this criticism would not be bothered by
confining persons if there were relatively greater certainty that the
individuals so confined would actually commit any crime, or a
crime of a certain (often unspecified) level of severity, if released,
but see the confinement of individuals who would commit no further crimes, or crimes of a relatively trivial nature, as inefficient,
if not unjust. Many, if not most, of those who criticize incapacitation on these gounds urge the expenditure of more time and money
towards improving our ability to predict future behavior.
A more fundamental level of criticism is based on the view
that even if we could predict future criminality accurately, it is
unjust to deprive a person of liberty on the basis of something that
has not yet occurred." A criminal justice system that imposes specified punishments for specified crimes gives us some degree of as" See, e.g., N. Moams, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62-73, 81-84 (1974); von
Hirsch, Predictionof Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted

Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1972).
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surance that we can plan our lives within the framework of the
laws. A system of preventive confinement depends not upon the
nature and quality of an individual's chosen acts, but upon the
state's determination of the individual's proclivities. Some would
dismiss such an argument on the grounds that preventive confinement should be applied only to those who have been convicted of
a criminal offense and have thereby forfeited their claim to many,
if not all, of the protections available to citizens in general. Such
a view is now generally discredited, however, and runs afoul of such
basic tenets of our criminal jurisprudence as proportionality, prohibition of ex post facto laws, and finality. Furthermore, when a
justification of criminal sanctions is based upon almost purely
preventive considerations, as incapacitation is, the danger grows
that preventive confinement will have less and less to do with past
proven criminality, eventually extending to preventive confinement of persons never convicted of having committed a criminal
offense, but believed likely to do so in the future. Such a practice
would be clearly inconsistent with basic concepts of individual
liberty. Yet such a possibility is by no means purely academic.
Upon reflection, our present practices of confining juveniles who
have committed no act that would be considered criminal for
adults or civilly committing adults believed to be "dangerous" to
themselves or others can be seen as preventive confinement. Such
practices, as well as laws that provide for extended terms or otherwise harsher treatment for convicted persons believed to be "dangerous," "habitual offenders," or "defective delinquents" depart
from dealing with the individual for past proven acts and move to
the realm of punishing for behaviors that are not only unproven,
but are not even alleged to have taken place. While the practice
of preventive confinement has a long history,39 it must be reexamined and, unless some clear connection to justice can be
found, abandoned as a basis for extending the length of confinement or otherwise increasing the severity of a criminal sanction.
B.

Deterrence

The concept of deterrence is another utilitarian justification
for imposition of criminal sanctions. The term is used to refer
either to general deterrence-sanctions imposed for the purpose of
threatening or educating potential offenders to stay within the

", See, e .g., Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement in AngloAmerican Law-PartI: The English Experience, 43 U. OINN. L. REv. 1 (1974).
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law-or specific or individual deterrence-sanctions imposed for
the purpose of preventing a specific offender from committing the
same or another offense in the future. Since both forms of deterrence are preventive in intent, much of the study of their role in
the selection of sanctions has focused on the extent to which it can
be documented that certain sanctions have the effect of restraining
particular individuals or citizens at large from engaging in crimes.
Thus, most of the debate as to the role deterrence should play has
centered around the validity of empirical findings concerning the
efficacy of sanctions in preventing or reducing crime."
A somewhat more philosophical perspective, however, requires consideration regarding whether it is proper, in selecting a
sanction for a particular law violator, to base that determination
on whether the sanction will have a deterrent effect either on that
offender or on others. If deterrence is considered a proper objective
of sentencing, are we not again entering the sphere where prediction must dominate over established fact? In fact, have we not
complicated matters beyond the problems attached to prediction
for the purpose of incapacitation, by now inquiring into not only
what effect the sanction selected is likely to have on a particular
offender, but also into the presumed effect of the sanction on some
vague body of others (i.e., potential offenders)? In all justifications
where prediction is involved, we depart from punishing for past
proven criminality and move to punishing for the purpose of promoting some supposed larger social good. That is, we cease to
punish this offender for the crime committed and begin to use him
as a means to attain other social goals." In this case, what happens
to a particular law violator depends not on the nature and quality
of his or her chosen acts, but upon a determination as to the proclivities of the individual or of others and how they can be altered.
To the extent that a criminal sanction for a particular individual
is extended or otherwise made more harsh for the purpose of deterrence, justice is no longer being done to the individual.
C.

Rehabilitation

Over the last few decades, sentencing policy has come to be
dominated by proponents of rehabilitation as a major factor in
0 See, e.g., Tulloch, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 36 THE PUBLIC INTEREST
103 (1974).
" See, e.g., F. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DmERRENCE 20-25 (NIMH Monograph, Public Health Service Pub. No. 2056, 1971).
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selecting a sanction for all but a few categories of offenders. The
thinking behind a rehabilitative purpose is that in light of high
recidivism rates, crime can best be reduced by offering offenders
opportunities or services that will produce a reorientation toward
society's values. It is assumed that most offenders suffer from some
sort of lack or defect in their personality or their life experiences
and that proper "treatment," education, or training can set them
on a course involving lawful behavior.
Originally, the rehabilitative ideal was dominated by a medical model in which criminal behavior was viewed as a result of
some pathology within the individual that could be diagnosed and
treated. More recently, the language of rehabilitation has begun to
change to an emphasis on "resocialization" or "reintegration," in
which both offenders and the communities from which they came
are seen as contributing to crime. Regardless of the term used to
describe them, however, most sanctions imposed for a "corrective"
purpose still involve attempts to change the offender to function
in ways seen as acceptable by the larger community and are, like
the purposes discussed above, utilitarian and preventive in intent.
On one level, the rehabilitative purpose of sanctions is criticized due to growing research evidence of the ineffectiveness of
current programs in achieving the desired result." The acceptance
of rehabilitation as a major purpose of sentencing has also been
deemed responsible for the growth of indeterminate sentences, increased discretion for criminal justice personnel throughout the
criminal process, increased sentence lengths, expanded use of the
criminal sanction to bring less serious behaviors within its sweep,
and numerous other problems that characterize our current sanctioning practices. 3 Not the least of such other ills is a tendency
throughout the criminal system to allow practices labeled "rehabilitative" which would be prohibited if labeled "punitive."
The use of such "aversive stimulti" as electric shocks to the
arms, feet, or groin" and drugs that produce fifteen minutes to one
hour of uncontrollable vomiting4 5 has been rationalized as necessary and humane "therapy." Numerous courts have accepted the
42

For more elaboration on this point, see the section of this article on parole,

infra.

See generallySwRuGGLE FOR JUSncE, supra note 27.
" "BehaviorMod"Behind the Walls, Tim, March 11, 1974, at 74 (Connecticut
State Prison).
41Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
'1
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line of reasoning that challenges to such "treatments" as violative
of the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
cannot succeed since by definition the treatment is not punishment and obviously cannot, therefore, be "cruel and unusual
punishment." A majority in Novak v. Beto46 upheld solitary confinement in Texas by linking isolation to rehabilitation. "Our role
as judges," insisted the court, "is not to determine which of these
treatments is more rehabilitative than another."47 The judiciary
has continued to approve indeterminate sentences to Patuxent,
Maryland's institution for "defective delinquents," even when this
means that persons committed there can stay behind walls under
similar conditions and longer than if they had been sentenced
criminally. The courts have insisted that confinement in Patuxent
is civil, not criminal (i.e., therapeutic, not punitive) since the legislature so defined it."5 Indeed, the majority of the highest court
appears to have accepted the rehabilitative ideal to a remarkable
extent. In Wolff v. McDonnell, the Supreme Court paid serious
attention to the "utilization of the disciplinary process as a tool to
advance the rehabilitative goals of the institution."4
The United States Bureau of Prisons justified its controversial
START (Special Treatment and Rehabilitative Training) program
5
that involved deprivations, like those associated with "the hole,"
on the grounds that the Bureau's own regulations on punitive segregation did not apply; START was not punishment, but treatment. 5' Similarly, the infamous "Adjustment Centers" of the California Department of Corrections have continually 52been described
and defended as therapeutic rather than punitive.
453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971).
Cited in Rothman, DecarceratingPrisonersand Patients,1 THE CIVIL LinERTIES REV. 25 (1973).
11See, e.g., McDonough v. State, 253 Md. 547, 253 A.2d 517 (1969); Blann v.
Director of Patuxent Institution, 235 Md. 661, 202 A.2d 722 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 955 (1965).
"0 418 U.S. 539 (1974). But see 418 U.S. at 580 (Marshall, J. dissenting) and
418 U.S. at 593 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
-1 "The hole" is a fairly common correctional term among inmates and correctional staff that refers to the worst type of punitive isolation.
1,Sanchez v. Ciccone, No. 20182-4, 3061-4 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, Jan. 7, 1974), cited in Opton, PsychiatricViolence
Against Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J. 637 (1974). The
Federal Bureau of Prisons has announced its intention to terminate the challenged
START program for "economic" reasons.
11Opton, supra note 51, at 620-21, 632-35. See also ASSEMBLY SELECr COMMIT"
'

TEE ON PRISON REFORM AND REHABILITATION, ADMINISTRATIVE
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The hard fact is that "treatment" in prisons is often indistinguishable from punishment. As one critic of the "treatment" ideal
has asserted:
The impossibility of differentiating some therapies from
some punishments indicates not too close a similarity, but an
identity. Punishment has long been acknowledged an important tool of psychiatric therapy and it remains well-recognized,
though controversial today. Therapy and its synonyms, "corrections," "rehabilitation," and "treatment," are prime motives of
those who design and operate the punitive institutions of society.
Over the years, Americans have become very considerably
less willing to permit torture and other extremely severe punishments in their penal institutions. The first, fourth, fifth, eighth,
and ninth amendments to the Constitution place some limits on
legal punishments, and feeble as these limitations are in practice, they do exist and they are slowly acquiring real force and
effect. Penal administrators turn, therefore, to therapy-aspunishment to carry out acts which, if named punishment,
would be clearly illegal and immoral.
The courts have been exceedingly slow to see through this
subterfuge. Only those practices most shocking to the conscience have been prohibited, and those often only on appeal.
Other practices which would be shocking indeed if they were
called punishment remain legal.53
The disturbing uses to which the rehabilitative ideal can be
put are not limited to the more extreme or painful treatment/punishments. There are more fundamental objections to the
concept of ordering imprisonment for rehabilitation. In the words
of C.S. Lewis:
To be taken without consent from my home and friends, to
lose my liberty, to undergo all those assaults on my personality
which modem psychotherapy knows how to deliver, to be remade after some pattern of "normality" hatched in a Viennese
laboratory to which I never professed allegiance, to know that
this process will never end until either my captors have succeeded or I have grown wise enough to cheat them with apparCAIFORNIA'S PRISONS (1973).
53

Opton, supra note 51, at 643 (footnotes omitted). For examples when higher

courts have looked behind the semantics, see Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136,
1136-37 (8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Carlson, 368 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. IMI.1973);
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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ent success-who cares whether this is called punishment or
not.'
The logic of cure inevitably leads toward forms of treatment
that involve changes in persons made against their will. The danger in this is most apparent in those cases where the subjects of
our therapy do not regard their actions as sick, but believe that
what they have done is "right." When we begin treating persons
for actions that have been chosen, we do not lift from them something from which they have been suffering, but we change them
to function in a way regarded as normal by the current therapeutic
community. In doing this, we display a lack of respect for the moral
status of individuals-a lack of respect for the reasoning and
choices of individuals. It is one thing to exact a penalty for what a
person did, and quite another to do so for what he or she is. In the
first instance, we say that the individual has incurred a debt, and
there is a finite price to be paid. In the second case, we say that
he or she is a deficient person and must become a better one before
being accepted by us.
Those who follow this line of argument do not necessarily reject the provision of programs and services for offenders. The point
is that these services must be voluntary, and the only way to insure
that utilization is truly voluntary is to disassociate any sanctions
or penalties from non-utilization. Federal District Judge Lawrence
Pierce has proposed a model in which short, fiat prison sentences
for most offenders, retributive in purpose, would be followed by
assignment for a definite period of time to a non-coercive program
of assistance in the community. Lack of coercion would be guaranteed by the fact that non-utilization of the offered services would
carry no sanction. The specified period in the community would
represent a fixed entitlement to services, not a requirement that
they be used. There would be no special conditions attached and
no supervision. Only conviction of a new crime would carry sanctions, as is true for citizens in general.55 Such a model would seem
to go a long way toward eliminating the dangers now associated
with the provisions of services to offenders.
11Lewis, The HumanitarianTheory of Punishment, reprinted in 2 CRIME AND
JusncE 45 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds., 1971).
" Pierce, Rehabilitation in Corrections: A Reassessment, 38 FED. PROBA7ION
14-19 (June, 1974).
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Retribution

It has traditionally been argued that retribution as a purpose
of criminal sanctions rests on moral rather than pragmatic
grounds. "Retributive conceptions of criminal punishment rest
essentially on the inherent propriety of punishment as a consequence of wrongdoing, that is, it amounts to an obligation to be
settled in an accounting among the offender, the victim, and society."56 "The retributive view rests on the idea that it is right for
the wicked to be punished: because man is responsible for his
actions, he ought to receive his just deserts." 57 In trying to apply a
moral principle to development of a sanctioning system, however,
utilitarian purposes often enter in. Most commonly, it is asserted
that the criminal law system must punish law-breakers in order to
avoid the "greater harm" of private retribution. Similarly, the
argument that imposition of sanctions must follow law violations
in order to uphold the declaratory and condemnatory functions of
the criminal law reflects addition of utilitarian concepts to what
otherwise appears to be a retributive approach.
Among the major purposes offered for criminal sanctions, retributive punishment is least subject to debates as to the feasibility of being accomplished. It is almost universally agreed that
prisons do succeed in exacting suffering. It is argued by some,
however, that current sanctions other than imprisonment do not
constitute sufficient retribution compared to harm done, while on
the other hand, others argue that imprisonment imposes more pain
or suffering than is deserved by many of the offenders who are sent
there. In fact, one of the major criticisms of retribution is the
assertion that it is not possible for mortals to determine with any
precision how much punishment is merited for any particular offense by a given offender. This line of debate also reflects the fact
that the terms "retribution," "vengeance," and "punishment" are
commonly used interchangeably. This author, however, prefers to
distinguish among these terms and to differentiate them from the
term "sanctions."
Throughout this article, the term "sanction" is used to mean
a penalty imposed. It may be imposed for purposes of punishment,
retribution, protection, deterrence, or treatment. The notion of
"sanction" is broad enough to include such dispositions as condi'

STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 48.
H. PACKER, THE LI nTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 37 (1968).
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tional or absolute discharge-penalties that can hardly be described as either punishment or treatment. In the sense that they
take note of wrong done, sanctions have a value in themselves."
"Retribution" is used herein to refer to the simple concept that
wrongdoing or law violation merits punishment. Thus, it is a more
purposive term than "sanction," referring as it does to a justification for the imposition of penalties. The use of the term "vengeance" is generally eschewed here as a term that is too heavily
value-laden to enhance calm analysis. Where it is used, it refers
to the traditional concepts of desire for revenge in the "eye for an
eye" sense with a somewhat blood-thirsty overtone. The term
"punishment" is used in the narrow sense of a sanction imposed
for the purpose of giving adequate expression to the seriousness of
the offense and concern over damage done to individual rights and
social interests. In reflecting the need to right the wrong and to
relate the disposition to the seriousness of the offense, "punishment" may contain elements of a limited retribution. 9
These distinctions are important in examining the concept of
retribution, since it is usually discussed in terms that imply that
"vengeance" is at its forefront. Retribution as a purpose of criminal sanctions is often attacked on the grounds that the imposition
of suffering for suffering's sake does not befit a civilized society.
Those who hold what has been characterized as the "humanitarian" view assert that to impose a sanction on a person simply
because it is deserved is mere revenge-harsh and self-righteous
and therefore barbarous. They maintain that the only legitimate
motives for imposing sanctions are to mend the criminal, deter
others, and protect society at the same time. Thus, persons holding
retributive views tend to come head-to-head with proponents of
the other major purposes for criminal sanctions in that retribution
is not primarily concerned with promoting some larger social good,
whereas incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation are predominantly utilitarian. In recent years, the utilitarians have by
popular concensus tended to predominate over retributivists by
such a margin that one might almost conclude that the debate had
ended. Yet the utilitarian purposes continue to be plagued by the
problems discussed with each of them above, perhaps the most
11These definitions are drawn from those set forth in LAW REFORM COMMISSION
THE PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING AND DIsPosrION, ix-x (Working Paper
No. 3, March 1974) (available from Law Reform Commission of Canada, 130 Albert
OF CANADA,

Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A OL6, Cat. No.: J-32-1/3-1974).
59 Id.
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fundamental of which is their tendency to remove from our sanctioning practices the concept of "desert."
But the concept of desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust. .. .There is no
sense in talking about a "just deterrent" or a "just cure." We
demand of a cure not whether it is just but whether it succeeds.
Thus when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and
consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly
removed him from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a
person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a "case."o
This author contends that current American sanctioning practices
do indeed bear all too little connection to justice, and in order to
re-infuse justice as a dominant force of the system, the utilitarian
purposes of sanctioning must be placed in a different perspective
to the system.
E.

Toward A New View of Sanctioning Purposes

It is of utmost importance to the equitable administration of
justice that the disputes be resolved regarding the proper goals of
a sanctioning system and the principles that are to guide its administration. In trying to select a purpose or purposes on which to
build a criminal sanctioning system, it may be useful to make a
distinction between justifying a practice or a system of rules and
justifying a particular action falling under the practice or system.
It is here asserted that utilitarian arguments are appropriate with
regard to questions about the purposes of a criminal sanctioning
system, while punitive or retributive arguments should be used to
apply particular rules to particular cases within that system. Thus,
we might decide to develop a system of laws and sanctions because
we thought it would have the consequence of furthering the interests of society. Our criminal laws and penalties for violations
thereof would be developed for utilitarian reasons: to condemn
actions that injure or impose hardships on others, to deter crime,
to protect society, and so forth. Furthermore, in designing a system
of sanctions, we would want to consider the consequence or effects
of the sanctions selected. Thus, we would not wish to establish
sanctions that involved unnecessary suffering, misery, degradation, or death-unnecessary in the sense that other, less drastic
,0 Lewis, supra note 54, at 43-44.
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practices would serve as well. Nor would we want to establish
sanctions that were unduly expensive compared to alternatives or
that were of a nature that required creating facilities or bureaucracies that would be resistant to change should more attractive
alternatives come to light. We would also be concerned, in developing a system of sanctions, with compensation or restitution for
harm done.
On the other hand, once a system of laws and sanctions had
been designed, based on their intended beneficial consequences for
society, and we were faced with an individual who had been convicted of a criminal act, it would be appropriate only to impose a
sanction for what had been done, as predetermined by the structure of our sanctioning system. No assessment of the benefit to be
derived from the sanctioning of this individual would be appropriate. We could not punish whenever or in whatever way some official thought would benefit society. This would prohibit us from
considering predictions of future criminality or potential for rehabilitation. In summary, in designing a system of laws and sanctions
for their violation, we should look forward to the future effects
upon society. In imposing a particular sanction, however, we
should look only backward, to the act committed.

III. SENTENCING DISPARITY
A large measure of the criticism that has been attached to
discretion in sentencing has been based on the assertion that discretion leads to unwarranted disparity in dispositions. Since
''equal treatment of those similarly situated with respect to the
issue before the court is a deep implicit expectation of the legal
order," 6' any hint that this expectation is not being fulfilled is
disturbing.
It is generally granted that for disparity to exist, differences
in sentences must be unwarranted or improper. Thus, while differences in treatment can be measured directly, these differences
must be evaluated in terms of other external factors to determine
whether they amount to disparity. Such evaluation is complicated,
however, by a fundamental problem. The assertion that differences in dispositions are permissible if related to rational and legal
factors assumes the existence of some set of explicit regulations or
standards regarding the factors that are rational and legal, but no
such set of standards is universally recognized.
1,E.

CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 14 (1949).
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Measuring disparity is also complicated by other factors. Disparity can be differentially defined and measured at different
stages of the criminal justice process and among the various
decision-makers (law enforcement, prosecutors, probation staff,
parole boards, and correctional staff) who impact directly or indirectly on the disposition and how it is carried out. Disparity can
also be measured at different levels within one stage; for example,
a judge can be inconsistent with his or her own usual standards or
inconsistent with the actions of other judges, or a group of judges
can be inconsistent with a statewide standard.
Disparity may arise in the length of a sentence, its nature
(definite or indeterminate), where the sentence is to be served (the
community, jail, or prison), who will make the release decision
(judge, correctional authority, or parole board), the statute chosen
for sentencing, the information available to the judge and the accused in sentencing, the information actually relied upon in sentencing, pre-trial disposition (release or detention)-the list goes
on and on. Disparity may be based on race, age, sex, demeanor,
counsel, economic status, the time of day or the mood of the judge,
or simply the randomness that predictably abounds when a process
is standardless.
Recent national events have focused the public eye on the type
of disparity that involves differences in dispositions based on social
or economic status. The Watergate-related cases and the Agnew
case have raised questions about "the class consciousness in our
system of justice, a system in which the white-collar criminal generally gets the break and the 'common' criminal gets the book." 2
The attention of the judiciary has also been kept to the issue
of disparity by recent publication of a report detailing an experiment engineered by some of their colleagues."3 Fifty federal district
court judges in the Second Circuit engaged in a simulation study
of their sentencing practices. While the report on the study acknowledged that there are methodological problems with general"2Miller, Respectability Helps If You're a Crook, The Washington Post, July
7, 1974, at B1, cols. 2-3. See also Sentencing Study, Southern Districtof New York
by the U.S. Attorney's Office [1972], in JusTmcE IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at
157. "There are plain indications that white collar defendants, predominantly
white, receive more lenient treatment as a general rule, while defendants charged
with common crimes, largely committed by the unemployed and under-educated,
*

.

.are more likely to be sent to prison." Id. at 159-60.
A. PARTRIDGE AND W. ELDRIDGE, FEDERAL JUDCIAL CENTER, THE SECOND CIR-

11

curr SENTENCINO STUDY (FJC Pub. No. 74-4, Aug., 1974).
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izing from a simulation to actual courtroom practices, it nonethe-

less concluded that the disparity exhibited in the study was a
reasonably good approximation of what really happens in the
courtrooms of the circuit. 4 Each of the judges participating in the
study examined the same set of presentence reports and indicated
the sentence he or she would impose in each case. A wide range
of disagreement was found to exist concerning the appropriate
sentences in the cases examined. This was true both as to length
of sentence and as to whether incarceration was appropriate. The
study thus supported the conventional wisdom that a defendant's
sentence depends on the judge he or she gets or, stated differently,
that defendants who are similarly situated do receive dissimilar
5
treatment from different judges.1
Accounts appear relatively frequently in which the charge of
sentencing disparity is supported by the assertion that blacks and
whites on the average receive different sentences for like offenses
in a particular jurisdiction or that average sentence lengths vary
widely from judge to judge or from judicial district to judicial
district." This has contributed to the conventional wisdom that
there is considerable disparity in the sentencing dispositions of
offenders. A number of studies have been conducted with the intent of documenting disparity. In general, the studies have selected
one or two factors of current popular interest and related them to
sentences received. While some of the findings would support a
need for further inquiry, the anecdotal approach of assuming that
the defendants compared on one such factor are otherwise compa6

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 9-11.

The 1972 Southern District of New York Sentencing Study cited a report
submitted in June, 1972, to the United States Senate Subcommittee on Criminal
Law and Procedure by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, which concluded that there are "considerable variations in sentence
length" in the United States District Courts that occur both between and within
districts. The National Institute study also focused on variations in sentences according to race of the defendant, and recapitulating the findings in this regard, the
Southern District study stated that "[a]mong the more iemarkable findings was
that 28% of white defendants convicted of interstate theft were sentenced to prison
during the four-year period [of the study], while 48% of black defendants convicted of the same offense were sentenced to prison. For postal theft, the imprisonment rate was 39% for white defendants and 48% for black defendants. In other
categories of offenses the variation between racial groups was not so significant
. . ." but nonetheless the percentage of black defendants given prison sentences
was higher than for white defendants for all crimes except income tax violation.
JUSTICE IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 158-59.
CS
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rable has been sharply criticized by researchers in the field.
Edward Green, for example, reviewed eleven studies, ten of
which found judicial sentencing disparity."7 He criticized each on
the grounds that they failed to account for factors concerning the
seriousness of the offense. His own study indicated that disparity
was generally not evident when the seriousness of the offenses was
considered, although some judges nevertheless were systematically
more severe than others, especially for crimes of moderate severity.
Green observed:
[T]he complexity of the sentencing process, not to mention the process of human judgment, has been all but submerged in simplistic interpretations based upon fragmentary
data. The neglect, in comparing the sentences of various groups
of cases, to impose statistical controls appropriate to the subject
of inquiry has resulted in a circularity of reasoning-the lack of
proper and uniform criteria for sentencing is inferred from the
disparities in sentences; and these in turn are attributed to the
lack of adequate criteria. 8
Two reviews of sentencing research literature by Hermann
Mannheim are likewise pervaded by the attitude that these studies
left much to be desired in sophi'stication, particularly the earlier
ones. 9 Michael Hindelang's review of eight studies concerning disparity on racial grounds cited three factors in explaining the differing conclusions reached by the studies: whether the courts were
southern or northern, the care taken in partialling out relevant
non-racial factors concerning the seriousness of the offense, and
the historical time period from which the cases were collected. Like
Mannheim, he found that methodological shortcomings were not
as prevalent in more recent studies."
John Hogarth briefly reviewed several studies as a prelude to
his analysis of sentencing in Ontario. Only one study that he reviewed (Green's) did not find judicial sentencing disparity, and
Hogarth criticized each, including Green's, on the grounds that
they failed to consider all relevant variables.7
67
66

E. GREEN,
Id. at 20.

JUDICIAL ATITUDES IN SENTENCING

8-20 (1961).

6 Mannheim, Some Aspects of Judicial Sentencing Policy, 67 YALE L.J. 961,
974-80; Mannheim, Sentencing Re-visited, in CIME AND CULTURE 349, 368-73 (M.
Wolfgang ed. 1968).
71Hindelang, Equality Under the Law, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 306 (1969).
1,J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS 6-12 (1971).
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These reviews of studies conducted on sentencing disparity are
often intended to indicate flaws that the reviewer plans to remedy
in his or her own study, and they are often followed or preceded
by an impassioned assertion of the need for more and better research. While it may be worthwhile to increase our understanding
of how an existing phenomenon operates and to what effect it
operates, there may be a point at which continuing inquiry is a
luxury, or even counterproductive. For example, it might be much
more valuable if the energy expended on documenting disparity
could somehow be transferred to revising sentencing legislation
and rules. Given the fact that remedies are available that will
greatly reduce the possibility that objectionable variables will be
utilized in selecting a sentence, why wait for further documentation that such variables are now effecting sentencing decisions?
While few studies have conclusively demonstrated to all reviewers that unwarranted sentencing disparities exist, this fact
cannot be attributed only to poor research designs or even to the
inadequacy of available data; nor does it convince us that disparity
does not exist. The core of the problem is that it is exceedingly
difficult to measure whether impermissible or illegal factors have
weighed heavily in sentencing when no rules, guidelines, laws, regulations, procedures, or court interpretations have made clear the
factors that are permissible and the weight each should be accorded in any given instance. There is, however, sufficient evidence to suggest that at least some of the factors that effect sentencing decisions would be regarded widely as objectionable if
made explicit. The alternative is clear, and clearly preferable:
more careful and precise legislation and rules that greatly decrease
discretion.
IV. ACCEPTABILITY OF SANCTIONS
Reexamination of current sanctioning practices cannot end
with discussion of discretion, lack of clear purpose, and disparity.
There is another consideration which, while seldom mentioned, is
fundamental: the acceptability of current sanctions by humanitarian and legal standards. Even though public and judicial attention
to prison conditions recently have increased dramatically, such
scrutiny rarely reaches back to sentencing.
A recent jail case72 found that the government breached its
72

Brown v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
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duty to use reasonable care in providing for the safety of a federal
prisoner by confining him "in a facility that it knew or reasonably
should have known was so inadequate that he could not be adequately protected from the forseeable risk of assaults by fellow
prisoners." 73 Undoubtedly judicial immunity would insulate sentencing judges from being found similarly liable for any such
breach of duty regarding their knowledge of the adequacy of facilities to which they order persons confined. Should not sentencing
judges, however, be held accountable for the welfare of persons
that they know, or reasonably should know, are being sent to
places that jeopardize their well-being?
Certain judges have commented at the time of sentencing
about their dissatisfaction or even abhorrence of the sanctions realistically open to them in imposing sentence. A few judges have
decried incarceration in many of our prisons and jails as ineffective, counterproductive, and ruinous and have refused to sentence
persons to them. Yet, most judges continue to sentence to incarceration persons they fear will be harmed by the experience, pleading
that they have no alternative. Is this really the case, or are we
seeing judicial action (or inactiop) that amounts to an abdication
of judicial responsibility? Judges need not wait until our sanctioning systems are restructured by law. Judges can demand evidence
that no lesser alternative, no less drastic conditions and restraints,
and no less dehumanizing environment will serve the state's purposes prior to imposition of a sentence of confinement. Judges can
devise, or require development of, more humane alternatives. It is
past time for more judges to refuse to sentence convicted persons
to confinement until they are convinced that their sentences will
be carried out in an acceptable fashion. This is not to say that we
should abandon punishment, but it seems that we have almost
come to the point of equating punishment with incarceration and
incarceration with the deprivations that currently characterize our
prisons and jails. These are unnecessary and unfortunate equations.
There has been considerable confusion surrounding efforts to
improve or reform prisons or their conditions and the relationship
of these activities to punishment. Many of the leading prison reformers have been concerned not with punishment but with its
accessories. It is a remarkable commentary on our acceptance of
" Id. at 728.
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that to which we are accustomed that we continue to abide all
manner of deprivations on top of the actual sentence that are in
no way authorized by the sentence, by statute, or by the requirements of humanity. It is really not the sentence, but the accessories
that are attached to it that appall us. As Karl Menninger has
stressed:
Jails ruin young men. Can't the public grasp this indisput-

able fact? How can a decent prison attempting a rehabilitation
program do anything for a boy who comes to it from a jail where
he has been raped, battered, vomited and urinated upon,
mauled and corrupted by some of the old-timers in the bullpen?
Even without the abuse and harrassment of other inmates,

the horrible confinement in hot, stuffy, crowded, dark, vermininfested iron cages is a terrible experience-literally a form of
torture. When one considers that this is all illegal, since the law
does not stipulate these iniquitous concomitants of detention in

any sentence, our sinfulness in permitting the situation to continue in our7 society, and at our expense, seems very evident and
very great.

Those who argue against elimination of the deprivations and
brutality that characterize our prisons and jails on the grounds
that every such reform diminishes the punishment have a distorted
view of the criminal law. When a person is sentenced to imprisonment, he or she is not sentenced at the same time to suffer partial
starvation, to endure physical brutality, to live in vermin-infested
cells, or to be exposed to substandard medical care. The essence
of imprisonment is deprivation of liberty. Deprivation of food or of
health or of books is unjust.
Legislatures and judges must begin to make clear not only
what their sentences require, but also what they do not embody or
authorize. As one district court judge has noted:
Obviously, among the states and within a particular state,
places of confinement vary widely in terms of the physical
plant, the size and quality of the staff, the nature of the program and regulations within the place of confinement, and the
characteristics of the inmate population. Generally speaking,
when the legislature prescribes imprisonment as the punishment for a crime, it does not undertake to define imprisonment.
11K. MENNINGER, WHATEVER BECAME OF SIN? 59 (1973). Dr. Menninger makes
a distinction between prisons and jails. While jails are undoubtedly the greatest
blight on the correctional-indeed perhaps on the American-scene, many prisons
continue to be close competitors.
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Generally speaking also, when a court sentences a defendant to
imprisonment, it does not undertake to define imprisonment.
Of course, both legislators and judges are usually generally
aware of the nature of the various places of confinement. Typically, however, it is administrators, by regulation, who determine the day to day, month to month, year to year reality which
lies within the skin of the word "imprisonment." 7 5
With the evidence now overwhelming that jail after jail and prison
after prison are determining imprisonment in implementation to
include unlawful deprivations of protected rights, it is clearly time
for the courts and legislatures to make themselves more explicit.
As the movement to insure that the rule of law prevails behind
prison walls has gained strength and as standards and codes of
prisoner rights have been formulated, some have cried "coddling
of criminals." Those who so fear should come out clearly into the
open and incorporate whatever starvation, disease, and brutality
they think necessary into the sentences they propose. Others have
cried, "You can't run a prison that way." Indeed, they may be
right. If they are, that may not mean that the protected rights
must be modified or eliminated, it may mean that the prison must
be modified or eliminated. As Judge Doyle has argued:
In my view, in passing upon these challenges to the rules
for institutional survival, the balance must be struck in favor
of the individual rights of the prisoners. That is to say, if one
of these rules of institutional survival affects significantly a
liberty which is clearly protected among the general population,
and if its only justification is that the prison cannot survive
without it, then it may well be that the Constitution requires
that the prison be modified.
Specifically if the functions of deterrence and rehabilitation cannot be performed in a prison without the imposition of
a restrictive regime not reasonably related to those functions,
it may well be that those functions can no longer be performed
constitutionally in a prison setting. .....1
V.

DEFERRED SENTENCING: PAROLE

As a noted author in the field of corrections has observed, "to
limit an analysis of sentencing to what goes on in courtrooms would
15Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 551n.7 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd 494
F. 2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
1' Id. at 554.
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be to play games with words."77 If a prison sentence means the
length of time that is served, judges have less and less to do with
that ultimate determination. Parole boards, parole agents, and
prison administrators to a growing extent decide how much, or how
little, time a convicted offender will remain confined. In 1966,
sixty-one percent of adult felons who left prison were released by
parole;"8 in 1970, seventy-two percent were so released." A 1965
survey found over 112,000 offenders under parole supervision and
estimated that this number would grow to more than 142,000 by
1975.11
Sentencing structures have been modified to allow for the role
of paroling authorities to a point where all jurisdictions utilize
indefinite or indeterminate sentences. These sentences provide a
fixed term beyond which an offender cannot be confined but place
with an administrative agency the authority to release offenders
before the expiration of the maximum term and after any minimum term that may have been imposed has been served. Paroling
authorities also have vested in them by statute the authority to reconfine persons released on parole at any time before the original
sentence has expired.' In both of these roles, paroling authorities
fulfill what were formerly exclusively judicial functions-making
the decision as to time spent in confinement before release and the
decision to re-incarcerate upon revocation of a conditional release
status. This discussion will focus mainly on the parole release function, as opposed to parole revocation or parole supervision and
services, since it is the component of parole that is most closely
related to, or is in fact a part of, sentencing.82
11Foote, The Sentencing Function, in A. PROGRAM FOR PRISON REFORM 17, 18

(Final Report of the Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in
the United States, sponsored by the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, Cambridge, Mass., 1972).
11 FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ADULT FELONS, 1966, at

43 (1966).
1g FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ADULT FELONS, 1970, at

43 (1970).
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 8 (1967).
s, See, e.g., RESOURCE CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL SERVICES, ABA
COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL FAcILITIES AND SERVICES, SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS

AND PRACTICES:

A PRELIMINARY

SURVEY

(1974).

81 For an overview of recent changes in parole revocation proceedings (largely
as a result of judicial action) see RESOURCE CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975

33

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

In the past several years, criticisms of the parole system have
increased substantially. Few informed observers are satisfied with
the parole process as it presently operates. Many critics focus on
procedural failings, contending that present parole procedures lack
the safeguards necessary for fair and accurate decision-making.
Other critics believe that the present parole system creates a level
of anxiety and frustration among confined populations that is
counter-productive in terms of institutional management and the
correctional process. A smaller, but growing, number of critics are
questioning the wisdom of having a parole system at all, contending that the system is not, and perhaps cannot be, effective in
achieving its stated goals.
The first level of criticism involves the procedures used in
making parole release decisions. Such procedures vary considerably among the state and federal systems. In most jurisdictions the
paroling authority at least conducts an interview, if not a hearing.
Some states utilize hearing examiners; some states use single parole board members. Other jurisdictions employ the full board, and
still others utilize a combination of hearing examiners and board
members to make the initial or final decision. Most jurisdictions
bar the use of counsel, do not permit the inmate to present witnesses in his or her own behalf, do not record the reasons for the
decision, keep no verbatim record of the proceedings, and do not
inform the inmate directly of the decision."3 The decision-making
process is one almost totally devoid of the due process protections
usually required of deliberations affecting substantial interests.
There are some signs of voluntary action on the part of a few
parole boards to introduce more regularity, openness, or procedural guarantees into the parole release decision. The United
States Board of Parole has recently undertaken a number of organizational and procedural changes designed to enhance equity and
effectiveness and to increase policy control.' At least ten states are
ABA COMM'N ON CORRECIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, SURVEY OF PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEDURES (1973). For discussion of the assertion that the current
SERVICES,

admixture of supervision and services in parole should be replaced by unsupervised
street release with voluntary access to services, see Pierce, Rehabilitationin Corrections: A Reassessment 38 FED. PROBATION 14-19 (June, 1974) and STUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 143-44.

81V. O'LEARY & J. NUFFIELD, THE ORGANIZATION OF PAROLE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES xxix-xxxix (2d ed. National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Hackensack, N.J., 1971).
94

28 C.F.R. § 2.1 et seq. (1974).
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now experimenting with "contract parole," referred to as "Mutual
Agreement Programming."' 5 While such agreements or contracts
were not designed specifically to deal with due process concerns,
they are designed to clarify the behavior or activities that are expected in order to obtain parole and to increase the certainty of
release if the "contract" is fulfilled. Whether they in fact accomplish these objectives is still an open question.
The overall picture of parole release in the United States,
however, remains one of systems unguided by rules, policy statements, or explicit decision-making criteria, unbounded by requirements for statements of findings or reasons, unilluminated by a
system of precedents, shrouded in secrecy, devoid of procedural
safeguards, unchecked by administrative review, and, until re-

cently, seldom subject to judicial review.86 In fact, all of the criticisms and deficiencies attached to procedures extant in judicial
sentencing apply with equal force to the parole release process.

Another level of criticism involves the counter-productive consequences of parole. Those who argue on this ground cite the high
level of tension and frustration that the parole process, with its
uncertainties and irrationalities, arouses in prisoners."7 Parole, as

13See

PAROLE-CoRPETCONS PROJECT, AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION,

DocuMNrr No. 3, THE MuTuAL AGREEMENT PROGRAM (1973).
11Although courts remain divided on the issues, they have recently shown
greater willingness to intervene in regard to an inmate's due process rights at parole
release hearings, primarily around the issue of the right to have reasons given when
parole is denied. For cases in which courts have reasoned that parole release effects
the same interests as parole revocation (i.e., incarceration or conditional freedom),
and thus applicants are entitled to certain due process protections, see United
States ex reL Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d
Cir.), vacated as moot sub noma., Regan v. Johnson, 95 Sup. Ct. 488 (1974); Childs
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.C. 1973); Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Solari v. Vincent, 77 Misc. 2d 54,
353 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Cummings (Michael) v. Regan, 76 Misc. 2d 357,
350 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Cummings (Thomas) v. Regan, 76 Misc. 2d 137,
350 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1973). For cases in which courts have rejected all claims
of due process rights at parole hearings, see Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole,
477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); Wiley v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 380 F. Supp. 1194 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Rankin v. Christian, 376
F. Supp. 1258 (V.I. 1974); Ornitz v. Robuck, 366 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Ky. 1973);
Barrandale v. United States Bd. of Paroles & Pardons, 362 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Pa.
1973); Harrison v. Robuck, 508 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1974). But see Ridley v. McCall,
496 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1974).
" See, e.g., ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE Nw YORK STATE SPECIAL
COMMISSION ON ATICA 93-98 (1972).
RESOURCE
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the primary means of access to the community short of serving the
full sentence, dominates the minds and hearts of prisoners. It also
"epitomizes for most inmates a system of whim, caprice, inequity,
and nerve-wracking uncertainty." The hostility and frustration
engendered by the parole system lead to substantial problems for
prison management. Instead of enhancing "appropriate" conduct,
the parole system can be the fuel for demonstrations, work stoppages, and other forms of protest and ventilation. It can also be
counter-productive to stated penal objectives in that it may foster
manipulative and deceitful behavior, since "playing to the parole
board" and "winning release" can come to predominate over any
meaningful voluntary program participation or course of conduct.
A third level of criticism is more basic, as it attacks the very
existence of parole. The Final Report of the Annual Chief Justice
Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy recommended that "[uintil
such time as the presentparole system is eliminated by short definite prison terms, due process should apply to both the initial
granting and revocation of parole or good conduct time."" Virtually an identical conclusion was reached in the Report on New
York Parole by the Citizen's Inquiry on Parole and Criminal Justice, Inc." The Working Party of the American Friends Service
Committee concluded that unsupervised street release should replace parole without the caveat that due process could attach to
the current parole structure to serve in the interim."
The growing evidence that prisons not only fail to "rehabilitate" those whom they hold captive but in fact impede that process
has been the primary catalyst to the growing doubts raised regarding the validity of parole. The achievability of the "rehabilitation"
of offenders through imprisonment is an essential premise upon
which parole systems function. Before an offender can be released
on parole, presumably several things must occur between the time
sentence is imposed and the maximum date of release. First, either
" Kastenmeier & Eglit, ParoleRelease Decision-Making: Rehabilitation,Expertise, and the Demise of Mythology, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 477, 488 (1973).
11A. PROGRAM FOR PISON REFORM 15 (Final Report of Annual Chief Justice
Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States, sponsored by the Roscoe
Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, Cambridge, Mass., 1972) (emphasis
added).

" CITIZEN'S INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INc., REPORT ON NEW

YORK PAROLE 295-98 (1974) (available from the Citizens' Inquiry, 84 Fifth Avenue,
N.Y., N.Y. 10011) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON NEw YORK PAROLE].
" STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE,

supra note 27, at 143-44.
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the fact of incarceration or the program and services available at
a given institution must induce a change in an offender that enhances the probability of law-abiding behavior upon release. Second, the paroling authorities must have the technology and ability
to both detect and monitor such changes in an offender's behavior
and attitude to determine the optimal point of release to the community. If either of these two elements is missing, that is, if a
corrective process either cannot or does not take place in prisons
or if paroling authorities lack either the means or the technology
to relate these changes to future behavior, then parole has failed
to meet both its statutory and philosophical mandate. In the words
of the American Correctional Association, "[U]nless it could be
illustrated that parole is the best known method of release there
would be little justification for its continued use."9
There are still large numbers of persons who cling fervently to
the hope that a rehabilitative process can occur in America's prisons. " Increasingly, however, the realization that "prisons do
change offenders" but that "the change is more likely to be negative than positive" 4 has produced reexamination of the entire system of dealing with convicted law violators. In fact, the overwhelming evidence is that prison programs and services, where
existent, are totally ineffective in reducing recidivism. As the Citizen's Inquiry on Parole in New York has stated:
Imprisonment in and of itself is an exercise in punishment
and repression. Donald R. Cressey describes treatment as "a
residual program-what is left over in prisons when punitive
and restrictive programs and practices are subtracted." It
might be even better described as a "residual illusion." Most
92 AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS

133 (3d ed. 1972).
91A few critics argue that the institution of parole should be abolishedespecially if it were effective in fulfilling its current mandate-because it is inextricably connected with goals that are philosophically objectionable.
In studying the criminal justice system we have found few things to be
thankful for, but the ineffectiveness of correctional treatment may be one
of those few. The only kind of morality the sticks-and-carrots regime of
indeterminate treatment in correctional institutions can teach is the externally imposed variety. If such correctional methods really did work, it
might be more success than a free society could endure.
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 45. See generally the discussion on purposes
of criminal sanctions in the text accompanying notes 38-55 supra.

11NATIONAL
CORRECTIONS 1

ADWSORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,

(U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1973).
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offenders have little or no exposure to treatment programs.
"The great majority of all institutional personnel were and are
assigned to custodial and service tasks."9
Even in instances where offenders do participate in a program
designed for their "treatment," there is no reliable data from any
of the treatment programs evaluated that there is any substantial
impact on future criminal behavior. Research studies conducted in
the California system concluded that "[t]here is no evidence to
support any program's claim of superior rehabilitative efficacy.""0
Likewise, a survey of one hundred treatment outcome studies that
have been published between 1940 and 1960 concluded that "evidence supporting the efficacy of correctional treatment is slight,
inconsistent, and of questionable reliability." 7 Yet another survey
that examined 435 treatment studies published since 1945 found
that "the evidence from the survey indicated that the present
array of correctional treatments has no appreciable effect-positive or negative-on the rates of recidivism of convicted
offenders." 98 With the debunking of rehabilitation as "one of the
greatest myths of twentieth-century penology," has come the painful realization that parole boards are searching for a non-existent
cure.
It has been argued that notwithstanding the failure of institutions to change offenders for the better, parole boards could still
perform a meaningful function by predicting the likelihood of future criminality by using indicators not related to "rehabilitation"
or its absence. Examples of factors that have been suggested for
parole boards' consideration include (1) the offender's preincarceration history (for example, previous criminal record, crime
for which convicted, age, race, facts and circumstances of the offense, personal and social history); (2) the readiness of the community to receive the offender and the availability of community
services to assist him or her (for example, family attitude, attitude
of law enforcement officials, community bias, parole plan); (3) the
offender's institutional adjustment and achievements (for exam'5

YORK PAROLE, supra note 90, at 272 (footnotes omitted).
Robison and Smith, The Effectiveness of CorrectionalPrograms,17 CRIME
REPORT ON NEW

AND DELINQUENCY 67, 80 (1971).

,7 Bailey, An Evaluation of 100 Studies of CorrectionalOutcome, in THE Soci-

CORRECTON 733, 738 (N. Johnston, L. Savitz &M. Wolfgang eds. 1970).
,1 Martinson, The Paradox of Prison Reform--H Can Corrections Correct?
THE NEW REPUBLIc, April 8, 1972, at 14.
OLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND
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ple, educational achievement, disciplinary infractions, personality
changes and developments); and (4) certain other specialized factors such as existence of detainers, length of time spent in prison,
or impressions gathered from a hearing with the offender.
There are a number of problems in attempting to transform
the role of parole boards from assessors of the extent of "rehabilitation" to compilers of facts to be used in making predictions. The
first and fourth categories consist almost entirely of data known at
the time of sentencing or controllable by the sentence. What is the
value of maintaining a separate agency to relate such facts to
future outcome? If any of these factors can be shown to be relevant
to post-release success or are otherwise legally important, why
should the sentencing judge not apply them as authorized by the
legislature? The second category of factors consists of items that
are inappropriate for consideration (e.g., attitudes of law enforcement officials and the community), even if it were assumed that
they could be measured, and items that speak to the failings of the
correctional system in paving the way for a releasee's transition
back to the community (e.g., parole plan, suitable residence). The
offender should not be penalized when the correctional system fails
to do its job. The third category of factors is based on the notion
of prisons as a beneficial experience for the inmate and disregards
the evidence that these institutional factors are not related in any
significant way to post-release outcome.
Another problem with the suggestion that parole boards
should turn to using prediction factors other than evidence of rehabilitation relates to our primitive ability in predicting human behavior. Actuarial tables probably represent the most sophisticated
ability to predict now available, but these tables have been criticized since they produce disturbingly high false-positive rates.
That is, they mis-identify an unacceptably high percentage of persons as likely to engage in criminal behavior. 9 Thus, were they to
be used extensively, parole boards would tend to impose unnecessarily long periods of incarceration on too many people. With the
most fundamental of our rights, liberty, at stake, society can ill
afford to permit "guesswork" to control who is to remain in prison
and who is to be released.
11See, e.g., von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALo L. REv. 717, 730-39 (1972); N. MomIs,
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISbNMENT 66-73 (1974).
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A few factors have been found consistently to relate positively
to post-release success. Other factors have also been identified as
being closely correlated with how long a person will be held in
prison. A recent study00 traced some one hundred thousand offenders through their correctional experience. Among other findings, the study demonstrated that both commitment offense and
prior record were associated with length of confinement and parole
performance. The study supported the conclusion of other researchers that more serious commitment offenses were associated
with greater likelihood of favorable parole outcome,'0 ' but the
study also supported the finding of other researchers that in the
vast majority of cases, those who served the longest time did more
poorly on parole relative to those held for briefer periods.'" Although the differences between those serving more or less time was
slight, this finding does suggest that parole policies that serve to
hold persons in prison for relatively more time may, in fact, increase the probability of future crime.
Studies of actual parole decision-making indicate that parole
boards do not utilize findings such as these, apparently because
minimizing recidivism is not the sole, or even the major, objective
guiding their decisions. Most boards fully acknowledge that they
try to serve other objectives in decision-making (e.g., retribution,
deterrence, increasing equity). In fact, most statutes governing
parole boards empower them to do so. The extent to which attempts to serve multiple objectives may be counterproductive to
minimizing recidivism, however, has not been the object of much
attention. We persist in examining individual offenders in seeking
a "cure" for crime and seriously neglect the role that societal institutions and systems may play in increasing or reducing crime.
A recent study of parole decision-making in a midwestern
state' 3 focused on the relationship between variables thought to be
important in parole decision-making and the actual decisions
110D.

GOTrFREDSON, J. NUFFIELD, M. NEITHERCUTT & V. 0'LEARY, FOUR THOU-

A STUDY OF TIME SERVED AND PAROLE OUTCOME (National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, Hackensack, N.J. 1974).
SAND LIFETraMs:

-

See, e.g. M.

LEVIN, THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL COURT SENTENCING DECISIONS

22-39, 53-60 (1973) (available from National
Technical Information Service, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Accession No. PB 220
710).
102 Id.
03 Scott, The Use of Discretionin Determining the Severity of Punishmentfor
IncarceratedOffenders, 65 J. CawI.L. & C. 214 (1974).
AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
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made by a parole board. Thus, the study dealt not with the relationship between offender characteristics and post-release outcome, but rather with the relationship between offender characteristics and severity of punishment as determined by the parole
board. The results reveal the factors which at least one parole
board actually used in making decisions.
The major finding of the study was that "parole board
decision-making appears to be based almost exclusively on one
legal criterion, the seriousness of the crime, rather than on an
inmate's institutional adjustment, or on an inmate's sociobiographical characteristics."''04 The study did find that certain
other factors were significant in determining the length of incarceration, but much less so than the severity of the offense, and very
few of the factors had the influence expected. For example, although the relationship between prior criminal involvement and
length of incarceration was statistically significant when all other
variables were controlled, they were related counter to that expected-for example, those with the most extensive records received the least punishment. This finding prevailed despite the
fact that generally "the most useful guide to prediction of parole
violation behavior is past criminal behavior" ' and an inmate's
overall institutional adjustment. The data indicated that when all
variables were controlled, those inmates behaving the best while
incarcerated were punished the most.' Again there is no little
irony in this finding since the inmates who were denied parole were
often encouraged by parole board members to join institutional
programs, and in interviews conducted by the researcher, a majority of the board members indicated that an inmate's institutional
adjustment was the second most important factor in determining
whether parole should be granted. 07 The author attributed this
rather remarkable inconsistency between knowledge about, or
stated belief in, the importance of certain variables and the way
in which they influenced or were absent from the parole decision
as follows:
Because of the extensive workload, the parole boards generally spend very little time per case. In an effort to adequately
gauge the decision time spent per case, the author spent one day
'o'

Id. at 222.

'

Id. at 217.

'0 Id. at 222.

"I Id. at 219.
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recording the amount of time the board spent discussing or
examining material before reaching a decision on each case.
The medium [sic] time per case was eight seconds. The time
allocated to decision-making perhaps gives some indication why
variables such as an inmate's institutional adjustment and
prior criminal record, both of which are not quantified and
which, therefore, require some time and effort to assess, have
little effect on the predicted severity of punishment.'
These findings raise strong questions regarding the viability of
the parole release process. Parole boards were ostensibly created
to evaluate the extent to which "rehabilitation," "reformation," or
"change" had occurred within an incarcerated offender during a
given period of time. They were further presumed to have the
expertise to relate this "change" to a particular offender's propensity to be a law-abiding citizen in the future. Upon these premises,
parole boards have been granted the discretion to release offenders
short of their maximum sentence at the "optimal point" for their
successful reentry into society.
It appears, however, that either parole boards do not give
primary consideration to their espoused role of maximizing parole
success or they do not know how, or are otherwise not able, to serve
that goal. Parole decisions are dominated by concern with the legal
seriousness of the crime, a concern that is more proper for the
legislature and the sentencing judge. It further appears that the
knowledge available from research findings is not utilized at all or
is countermanded by parole policies. The logical conclusion is that
"[i]f parole boards are not acting or functioning on any basis
other than that available for the judiciary, it seems rather redundant, expensive, and ridiculous simply to append one more agency
making decision [sic] with real consequences for individual
lives."' 09
Notwithstanding the growing consensus that parole systems
cannot meet their fundamental function-protecting society by
predicting potential criminality-it has been argued that the parole system should be maintained to fulfill still other objectives.
While it will undoubtedly be difficult to simply expunge parole
systems from the correctional scene, the subsidiary functions suggested could either be performed better by other elements of the
criminal justice system or should not be performed at all.
108Id. (footnote omitted).
101Id. at 223.
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One major role that the parole system performs now, and
could continue to perform, involves helping institutions maintain
control over prisoners. Numerous observers are now convinced that
correctional administrators "bought" the rehabilitation ideal and
the concept of the indeterminate sentence only after they realized
the extent to which increased control over prisoners could result.
Given that institutional staffs almost always supply the information utilized in considering applications for parole, staff power is
immense. ' The threat of parole denial is routinely used to gain
compliance with the daily regimen of prison life. Inmates may be
"programmed" into work, education, training, counseling, or other
activities on the grounds that the parole board will view such participation favorably.'
Profound psychological pressures are created for inmates in
trying to conform in behavior, attitude, and program participation
to what will be viewed with favor by the parole board while having
little direct knowledge of paroling policies or criteria. These pressures are substantially increased for the scores of inmates who try
to conform to what is desired and nonetheless find that they are
denied parole. Manipulation of inmate behavior by implicit or
explicit promises of release, when the factors on which release
decisions are made seldom have much connection to what an inmate has done in prison, is a dangerous game that harms not only
the inmate, but also the public, which eventually must bear the
brunt of the hostility engendered."'
A related function that parole boards could perform involves
the statistics of prison populations. Economies of scale mean that
underpopulated institutions may be unduly expensive to operate.
Overpopulated institutions create morale, maintenance, and
safety problems. The parole board can operate to help keep populations near desired levels. While this function is not usually made
explicit, on occasion it may become so if a judge demands lower
population levels or observers agree that an explosive situation
could be alleviated by increasing release rates. In some instances
parole boards have been attacked for supporting requests for new
1,0
See generally Milleman, Due Process Behind the Walls, in PmsoNERS'
RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 79 (M. Hermann & M. Haft eds. 1973).
MThere is a remarkable congruence between the "needs" of inmates and
program availability or institutional needs in most institutions.
112See Greenberg & Stender, The PrisonAs A Lawless Agency, 21 BuFFALo L.
Rav. 799 (1972).
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facilities by increasing the average length of time served and decreasing the proportion of those released through parole. Conversely, some correctional planners are working directly with parole boards to try to decrease the length of time served or increase
the percentage released on parole in order that antiquated facilities
may be closed or community-based programs expanded. While
there may be considerable utility in having a mechanism for adjusting prison population levels, it is hard to see this alone as a
justification for parole boards. More fundamentally, individual
liberty is at stake, and the conversion of a process conceived as one
to help inmates and protect the public into a statistical manipulation mechanism should not be allowed.
It has been suggested that parole boards could expand their
role as de facto sentencing review boards. The role of such boards
could be to reduce sentencing disparity and to mitigate the harshness of current sentences. While there is considerable evidence that
the criminal justice system should pay more attention to unwarranted disparities in sentencing and to mitigating the harshness of
many sanctions, allowing parole boards to continue to perform
administrative correction of a systemic problem is inappropriate,
even if it could be accomplished effectively. "Current sentencing
theory, by maximizing everyone's discretion, causes the disparities
in the first instdnce. If sentencing criteria were developed as they
should be, and the discretion of the sentencing authority structured and limited as it should be, the disparities would not
arise.""' 3 For parole boards to try to fill these gaps after the fact
would simply perpetuate the problem that the various sectors of
the criminal justice system can evade responsibility for their actions.
VI.

MAJOR EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING SENTENCING

This section will briefly outline the major existing proposals
set forth by various authorities as necessary improvements to our
system of criminal sanctioning. Coursing through each as a dominant theme is the identified need to either improve, guide, correct,
restrict, shift, or eliminate the staggering amount of discretion that
presently characterizes virtually every aspect of the sentencing
process. The American Bar Association,"' the National Advisory
REPORT-ON NEw YORK PAROLE, supra note 90, at 284-85.
,, See American Bar Ass'n, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives
and Procedures (Approved Draft 1968) in COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORREcrIONAL
"'
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Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 15 the National Council on Crime and Delinquency," ' the American Law
Institute,"7 as well as a number of other corrections-related commissions, study groups, and individuals, have endorsed various of
these remedies after having reached the conclusion that the system
as presently constituted does not achieve equal justice for those
who violate our laws and face sanction. This review of proposals
for reform reveals not only what the respective advocates see as
causes or contributions to disparate or unjust treatment of offenders in the sentencing process, but also strikingly highlights how
little regulated that process is today.
A. Proposals for Improving the Exercise of Discretion
1. Improvement of Sentencing Information and Hearing
Many commentators have stated, and most model acts seem
to agree, that improvement of the information upon which judges
base their sentencing decisions will improve the exercise of discretion and yield more rational sentences. The National Advisory
Commission," 8 the Model Penal Code,"' and the ABA Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice' all call for the expanded use of
11-12 to 11-42 (ABA Comm'n on Correctional Facilities
and Services & Council of State Gov'ts, August 1972) [hereinafter cited as ABA
Sentencing Standards]; American Bar Ass'n, Standards Relating to Appellate
Review of Sentences (Approved Draft 1968) in COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS 11-44 to 11-50 (ABA Comm'n on Correctional
Facilities and Services & Council on State Gov'ts, August 1972) [hereinafter cited
as ABA Sentence Review Standards].
" See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
CORRECTIONS (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1973) [hereinafter cited as N.A.C.
LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS

CORRECTIONS REPORT]; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND GOALS,

1973);

A

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME

(U.S. Gov't Printing Office

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,

(U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1973).
M'See National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Sentencing Act
(1972 Revision) in COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND
STANDARDS 11-52 to 11-60 (ABA Comm'n on Correctional Facilities and Services &
Council of State Gov'ts, August 1972) [hereinafter cited as Model SentencingAct].
" See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code-Sentencing Provisions
(1963) in COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS 11-62 to
11-79 (ABA Comm'n on Correctional Facilities and Services & Council of State
Gov'ts, August 1972) [hereinafter cited as MPC Sentencing Provisions].
US N.A.C. CORRECTIONS REPORT standard 5.14, at 184-85.
"' MPC Sentencing Provisions § 7.07, at 11-76, 77.
'' ABA Sentencing Standards part IV, at 11-27 to 11-30.
COURTS
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pre-sentence reports (except in simple or straightforward cases)
and for stricter standards and quality control of the information
presented.
Despite the growing. number of recommendations regarding
the desirability of utilizing pre-sentence reports, relatively few
states today explicitly require an investigation before a sentence
is imposed. Most statutes place the decision to make an investigation within the discretion of the sentencing judge. Further, most
legislation dealing with pre-sentence reports is broadly constructed, indicating only that a report should be developed
"promptly" and that the probation officer shall investigate the
convicted defendant "fully." Other statutes are somewhat more
specific in indicating the information to be presented, referring
most often to the circumstances of the crime, the prior criminal
record, occupational history, educational background, and so
forth. As it stands today, pre-sentence reports are of uneven quality and often contain much potentially harmful information of
dubious relevance and accuracy. Indeed, in one recent case a federal judge found that a classification study, that was required by
statute for a youth offender prior to sentencing and was prepared
by a team of professionals, was so gouged with misinformation and
false assumptions as to be virtually useless as a sentencing aid and
was dangerously misleading as well.'2
Another proposal that relates to the quality of the information
relied upon in imposing sentence concerns the disclosure of presentence reports to the defendant and his or her counsel. Seldom
do statutes establish the defendant's right to examine the report
prior to the imposition of sentence. In those states where the statutes are silent on this question, it has been held that the sentencing
judge has the discretion to decide whether some or all of the contents of the report may be disclosed. The various model acts take
divergent approaches to this issue. The Model Sentencing Act provides for disclosure but allows the identity of the informant to be
withheld if security would be endangered by disclosure.' 2 The
ABA Sentencing Standards favor disclosure but permit the judge
sufficient discretion in "extraordinary cases" to excise portions
"which are not relevant to a proper sentence, diagnostic opinion
which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, or
sources of information which has [sic] been obtained on a promise
121
22

United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1974).
Model SentencingAct § 4, at 11-54.
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of confidentiality."'' 3 The Model Penal Code requires the sentencing court to inform the defendant of the report's factual contents
and any conclusions drawn therein.2 3 The National Advisory Commission, on the other hand, advocates full and complete disclosure
of pre-sentence reports, finding that the arguments in opposition
12
beg the essential question of substantive fairness in sentencing.
A final proposal in this category concerns extending the scope
of the sentencing hearing to permit defense counsel the opportunity to challenge, through the traditional adversary process, the
validity of any ex parte or unverified statements that may be contained in the pre-sentence report or otherwise used in sentencing
determination. Both the American Bar Association' "6 and the National Advisory Commission'27 endorse the concept of a sentencing
hearing at which the defendant has full rights of confrontation,
cross-examination, and representation by counsel in addition to
the right of allocution.
2. Statement of Reasons
A related approach to improving the exercise of sentencing
discretion involves requiring of sentencing judges a written or express statement of reasons for the sentence imposed:
The duty to give an account of the decision is to promote
thought by the decider, to compel him to cover the relevant
points, to help him eschew irrelevancies-and finally, to make
him show that these necessities have been served. The requirement of reasons expressly stated is not a guarantee of fairness.
The judge or other official may give good reasons while he acts
upon outrageous ones. However, given decision-makers who are
both tolerably honest and normally fallible, the requirement of
stated reasons is a powerful safeguard against rash and arbitrary decisions. 2
The National Advisory Commission has recommended that a
verbatim transcript of the hearing be made, that specific findings
by the court be required, including the reasons for selecting the
particular sentence imposed, and that a precise statement of the

121

ABA Sentencing Standards§ 4.4, at 1-28, 29. MPC Sentencing Provisions § 7.07(5), at 1-76, 77.

12

N.A.C. CORRECTIONs REPORT standard 5.16, at 188-89.

'I

'M ABA Sentencing Standards § 5.4, at 11-34.
'W N.A.C. CORRECTIONS REPPORT standard 5.17, at 190-91.
'2 M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 40-41 (1973).
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terms of the sentence and of the purpose that sentence is meant
to serve be made a part of the record.' 9 Without a record of the
sentence proceedings and the basis for the sentence, any meaningful appellate review of the decision is rendered a nullity. Indeed,
it is ironic that in the few instances where a sentence has been
overturned on appeal, it more often than not has been due to the
gratuitous remarks of a judge that imputed some improper motive
to the sentencing disposition. Thus, without a firm rule requiring
explanation of sentences, judges are not ordinarily disposed to
open themselves to appellate review and possible reversal. To
counter this problem at least two state supreme courts have required their judges to set forth in writing the reasons for the sentences imposed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court requires the trial
judge, as soon as notified that an appeal has been taken, to file
forthwith "at least a brief statement in the form of an opinion of
the reasons for the. . . judgment. . . ."I" The Supreme Court of
New Jersey has adopted a rule requiring that trial judges shall
attach to the pre-sentence report a brief statement of the basic
reasons for the sentence imposed.' 3 ' In short, it is expected that a
requirement of an explanation of the sentence selected will assist
in bringing some rationality to sentences, in increasing consistency
among judges, in providing a basis for reconsideration or for challenge on appeal, and in providing a more explicit mandate to
correctional authorities in carrying out the sentence.
3.

Sentencing Institutes

Another means of improving the sentencing decision involves
expansion of an institution now fifteen years old in the federal
system-the sentencing institute. Provided for by act of Congress
in 1958,132 the institutes are held periodically to expose judges and
prosecutors to the experience and insights of their colleagues as
well as to those of correctional practitioners. Although the institutes have been criticized on the basis of infrequent meetings and
failure to produce any significant or lasting changes in judicial
attitudes about sentencing, they nevertheless have provided a
forum for the exchange of ideas and for ventilation of some of the
more obvious weaknesses of the sentencing process. The proceedings of the institutes are published in FederalRules Decisions for
i

'
'3

N.A.C. CoRREcriONs REPORT standard 5.19, at 195-96.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Rules of Court, R. 56.
N.J. Crma.
PRAC. R. 3:7-10(b).
28 U.S.C. § 334 (1971).
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the benefit of those unable to attend and for later consideration
and study.
4. Judicial Visits to Institutions
Numerous bodies have recommended that judges should be
required to periodically visit all institutions and facilities to which
they may sentence offenders. 1' It is assumed that judges can make
more intelligent and appropriate dispositional decisions when they
are familiar with the atmosphere, conditions, programs, personnel,
and so forth, that exist in the facilities within their jurisdiction.
Such proposals also seek to provide a measure of continuity to the
criminal justice process that is lacking. At this time, the only
person who is exposed to each part of that process is the convicted
defendant, who is not often consulted about how well the various
elements mesh. Additionally, judges who impose a criminal sentence have a responsibility to satisfy themselves that the purposes
for which the sentence was imposed have a reasonable chance of
reaching accomplishment.
5. Increased Feedback to Judges
A final proposal for improving the exercise of discretion suggests that judges be regularly supplied with reports on sentences
imposed in their court or district, accompanied by relevant information about those sentenced and their offenses. In addition,
judges should receive follow-up information about defendants they
have sentenced regarding the apparent effectiveness of sentences
imposed. A more complicated approach would involve full-blown
research on the outcome of various types of sentences for various
categories of offenders on a wide-scale basis. It is argued that such
reports would enable judges to compare and contrast their decisions, to initiate informal discussions among themselves, to modify
their approach to the importance of certain criteria used in the
sentencing decision, to learn the kinds of sentences that seem to
work best for various kinds of offenders, and thus to "normalize"
and improve decisions over time.
B. Proposals for Guiding or Regulating Discretion
1. Joint or CollateralDecision-Making
One approach to guiding the discretion of sentencing judges
1'3 See, e.g., N.A.C. CORECTaONs REPoRT standard 5.10, at 175-76; ABA Sentencing Standards § 7.4, at H-41, 42.
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involves setting up mechanisms by which they share the sentencing decisions with others. A Harvard criminologist, Sheldon
Glueck, suggested over thirty-five years ago that sentences should
be determined by a panel of three: (1) the judge, (2) a psychiatrist
or psychologist, and (3) a sociologist or educator."' Although this
inter-disciplinary approach to shared sentencing never gained acceptance, sentencing councils composed of judges of the same
court exist in a few jurisdictions. Such councils were developed
originally in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.' = The judges of that court meet regularly in
panels of three to discuss pending sentencing decisions. The sentencing judge retains all responsibility for the ultimate sentencing
decision, with his or her colleagues acting only in an advisory capacity. Experience in the eastern district and elsewhere indicates
that three major benefits seem to flow from the use of councils.
First, individual extremes of sentencing inclination tend to be tempered. Second, the sentencing judge often moves toward a sentencing stance reflecting the views of the other members. Third, there
seems to be a net movement toward more lenient sentences. 3
However, a recent study conducted under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center casts doubts on the theory that participation
in sentencing councils tends to generate a common approach to
sentencing by the judges involved. 3
2. Development of Sentencing Guidelines
Yet another approach to guiding or regulating discretion is
development of what Judge Frankel describes as "codified weights
and measures" or a "calculus" of aggravating and mitigating factors that would provide guidance to judges as they "brood[s] in a
diffuse way towards a hunch that becomes a sentence."' 38 Such a
proposal might involve the use of empirical formulas based on
evaluative studies of the interaction among varying offender/offense characteristics, dispositions, and outcomes. While
sentencing judges would remain free to impose any sentence statutorily authorized, they would have the benefit of a "suggested sentence," or suggested sentence range, developed from long-term
"'

M.

FRANKEL,

CRaMiNAL SENTENcEs 74 (1973).

Id. at 64-70.
W Id. at 70-71.
"3 A. PARTRIDGE AND W. ELDRIDGE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE
cunT SENTENCING STUDY 23 (FJC Pub. No. 74-4, August 1974).
MM. FRANKEL, CRMmNAL SENI C s113-14 (1973).
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follow-up of prior offenders. This approach is not unlike the parole
decision-making guidelines recently adopted by the United States
Parole Board.'39
The Model Penal Code,"' the National Advisory Commission
standards,"' the ABA Sentencing Standards,"' and others move
toward this approach in a somewhat less scientific manner than
that envisioned by Judge Frankel by listing factors to be taken into
account, some with an order of preference, in arriving at various
dispositions. Several current attempts to draft capital punishment
legislation to withstand Supreme Court review also take this approach by listing mitigating factors, the presence of any of which
would eliminate a death sentence otherwise required.
3. Improved Statutory Structure
Proposals for improving the sentencing function by legislative
action involve modification or improvement of the sentencing
structure embodied in correctional or criminal codes and the introduction of more legislative guidance as to the purposes to be served
in sentencing.
The inconsistencies and irrationalities characteristic of most
criminal codes have occasioned lengthy discourse in many volumes. The fact that criminal penalties have been added and
patched onto codes as new laws are passed has resulted in a confusing variety of sentence specifications that are often grossly dissimilar for basically similar conduct. Virtually every sentencing study
conducted in the last ten years has recommended that states revise
their criminal codes to enumerate a limited number of categories,
each with its own set of alternatives, with each offense assigned to
a particular category.' It is most often suggested that the categories be designed to reflect substantial differences in terms of gravity of the offense and that the range of allowable sanctions be
differentiated among the categories by setting a maximum term
for each category, except perhaps for the most serious offenses.'
As stressed throughout this article, a more fundamental shortcoming to legislation dealing with the sentencing process is the
''
4
"
4
"

See 28 C.F.R. § 2.1 et seq. (1974).
MPC Sentencing Provisions § 7.01-7.06, 7.09, at 11-70 to 11-76, H-79.
N.A.C. CORRECTONS REPoRT standards 5.2-5.8, at 150-72.
ABA Sentencing Standards § 2.3-3.8, at 11-14 to H-27.
See, e.g., N.A.C. COmiECTONs REPoRT standard 16.7, at 567-68.

4 !d.
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consistent failure of state and federal legislators to clearly set forth
the purposes and objectives to be served by the imposition of criminal sanctions. As damaging as this shortcoming may be, most existing proposals for change do not address it squarely, but continue
to endorse all of the purposes traditionally suggested without providing further guidance as to how or when they are to be accomplished. 4 4. Standard Setting
As demonstrated by repeated reference, organizations and
commissions such as the American Bar Association,' 46 the American Law Institute, 4 ' the National Council on Crime and Delinquency,' and the National Advisory Commission' and others
have undertaken to develop standards, guidelines,and models for
important criminal justice issues in the hope that legislatures,
agency administrators and operating personnel, courts in their
rule-making authority, and so on, will adopt them as law or policy
or, at a minimum, give careful consideration to the issues raised.
C.

Proposal for Correcting Disparity-Appellate Review of
Sentences

Appellate review of sentences has existed for two generations
in England and now exists, in varying forms, in approximately one
third of the American states. However, in most states and the
federal system, sentencing power is vested solely with the trial
judge and is unreviewable by the appellate courts absent compelling or unusual circumstances. 5 ' This situation exists despite the
fact that appellate review has been endorsed in principle by the
American Bar Association,' the Brown Commission, 2 the Katzenbach Commission,1 3 and the National Advisory Commission. 54
"'
'"
147

See text accompanying supra notes 32-37.
See ABA Sentencing Standards,supra note 114.
See MPC Sentencing Provisions, supra note 117.

"'

See Model Sentencing Act, supra note 116.
See N.A.C. CORRECTIONS REPORT, supra note 115.
See compilation of statutes, supra note 6.
See ABA Sentence Review Standards, supra note 114.

152

FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS 317

"

(U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1971).
' PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

145-46 (1967).
-5 N.A.C. CORRECTIONS REPORT standard 5.11, at 177-79.
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Advocates of appellate review argue that its implementation
would achieve the purposes set forth in the ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences:
The general objectives of sentence review are:
(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length,
having regard to the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by
affording him an opportunity to assert grievances he
may have regarding his sentence;
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of
the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of
the sentencing process; and
(iv) to promote the development and application of
criteria for sentencing which are both rational and
just.'1
Closely aligned to the question of appellate review of sentences is
the already mentioned requirement that judges provide written or
express reasons for the sentence imposed. Without such a record,
review, and possible reversal, of a sentence that may be in error is
much more problematic.
D. Proposals to Restrict Discretion
1. Decriminalization
Scholars and criminologists are asserting with increasing vigor
and frequency the need to decriminalize certain types of prohibited
conduct as inappropriate objects of criminal law." 6 There is considerable disagreement among judges over how to deal with certain
non-violent "crimes" such as gambling, public drunkenness, private sexual acts between consenting adults, drug use, obscenity,
and vagrancy, and hence, there is considerable disparity in how
they are handled. Thus, it is argued that repeal of the statutes that
make such behaviors criminal is a sensible way to end the unequal
application that presently characterizes their enforcement. If such
behaviors, often grounded on the status of an individual rather
than on the commission of a specific criminal act, were removed
from the criminal law, the system could concentrate on areas of
consensus and would be less prone to disparity. By this reasoning,
,5 ABA Sentence Review Standards § 1.2, at H-45, 46.
See, e.g., Dash, Means and Methods Employed in Penal Law, 10 CRIM. L.
'
BUL. 571 (1974); R. CLARK, CrME IN ArmRIcA (1970); N. MoRIs AND G. HAwKINS,
THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970).
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decriminalization is seen as an efficacious way of eliminating disparity in areas of the criminal law most susceptible to that ill.
2. Mandatory Minimum Sentences
This proposed remedy emphasizes taking a firmer stand on
specific offenses or offender types, rather than rationalizing the
sentencing structure. This proposal urges that legislatures should
fix mandatory minimum terms, require incarceration without the
possibility of probation, or otherwise restrict the discretion of the
judge for offenses or offender types. Such statutes still might allow
the judge to determine the maximum term or to choose sentence
type and range more freely for some offense categories.
3. Drastic Reduction of Discretion
Several individuals and groups have proposed new models for
sentencing that would drastically reduce discretion. United States
District Judge Constance Baker Motley, for example, has proposed
a sentencing system that would be based on retribution, preventive
detention, and sometimes individual deterrence, except for youths
and first offenders, where the goal would be to reintegrate them
into society.157 According to Judge Motley's proposal, graduated
and relatively short, mandatory penalties would be provided except that every first offender would be granted a suspended sentence with an "appropriate period of probation,"'58 excluding "particularly heinous offenses such as premeditated murder and consumer poisoning.""'5 In the case of monetary fraud, first offenders
would also be required to make restitution. After the first offense,
a short mandatory prison term of up to one year would be fixed by
the legislature. For the third offense, a mandatory sentence of up
to three years would be provided by law. For the fourth offense, a
mandatory sentence of up to five years would be legislatively provided. For the fifth offense, and every offense thereafter, a mandatory sentence of five years would be imposed.' The only exceptions-aside from those provided for young offenders-would involve "exceptional or unusual mitigating circumstances, such as
the imminent death of the defendant or his providing crucial testi"1 Motley, "Law and Order" and the CriminalJustice System, 64 J. Caim. L.
& C. 259, 266-68 (1973).
,"I Id. at 267.
152Id.
190Id.
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6
mony for the government," and "heinous crimes like murder." '
For the former, the sentencing judge could recommend a suspended sentence that would have to receive the approval of a reviewing panel. For the latter, first offenders would receive a mandatory sentence depending on the category of crime committed,
and subsequent offenders would receive very long mandatory sentences. 2 Under this proposal the length of sentence, with a few
was
exceptions, would depend on the number of times a person
1 3
convicted of a crime and the seriousness of those crimes. 1

E.

Proposals for Shifting Discretion

1. IncreasedDiscretion of the CorrectionalAuthority
As increasing use has been made of various kinds of
community-based correctional programs, it has been suggested
that the correctional agency must have greater authority to move
offenders among the various programs. It is argued that as use
increases of halfway-in and halfway-out houses, work release,
study release, furloughs, day care programs, and so forth, the involvement of the sentencing judge or a parole board becomes unwieldy. Proponents of this view would retain varying levels of involvement for the judge and the parole board and would increase
the flexibility of the corrections agency in making offender placements. Thus, the judge might retain the initial decision as to
whether incarceration is indicated, and the parole board might
hold a hearing early in an offender's term and approve a general
course of progression involving increasing community activities.
Within the broad parameters set by the judge and the parole
board, the corrections agency would have discretion concerning
where, how long, and under what conditions, offenders were supervised.' 6'
Creation of a Specialized Disposition/ClassificationAgency

2.

Several proposals have been made to transfer dispositional
and classification functions performed throughout the criminal
justice process to one agency or body. Senator Percy, for example,
, Id. at 267-68.
,2 Id. at 267.
"

Id. at 268.

See, e.g., N.A.C. CoRRacrloNs
46 and chapter 12, at 401-02.
I"

REPORT,

supranote 115, standard 7.4, at 244-
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has sponsored a bill " to reform the federal corrections system by
creating a "Federal Circuit Offender Disposition Board" and "District Court Offender Disposition Boards" that would, respectively:
(1) set national guidelines for decision-making regarding pre-trial
release, pre-trial diversion, probation, parole, and other forms of
release, and (2) perform pre-trial and pre-sentence investigation
and report functions and carry out the functions relating to probation, parole, or other forms of release now performed by various
other bodies. Under this proposal, sentencing would still be performed by the trial judges, but they would be provided with national guidelines and standard kinds of information about offenders. Dispositional decisions other than the imposition of sentence,
however, would be made by the newly-created boards. 1
Other similar proposals would remove the imposition of sentence from the judge as well. Such suggestions tend to retain the
various dispositional points at which discretion can be exercised
but transfer responsibility for exercising it from the judge, the
parole board, and others, to one body. It is argued that this would
insure consistency of treatment throughout the criminal process
and place discretion in the hands of persons selected for their professional competence to exercise it in decision-making of this kind.
3.

Return of DiscretionExercised by Others to the Judiciary

A proposal to shift, and to a certain extent limit, discretion
from paroling authorities back to the judiciary has been put forward by Richard McGee, president of the American Justice Institute and former director of corrections in California."7 Under
McGee's proposal, all sentencing, term fixing, releasing, discharging, and revoking of releases would be carried out by trial court
judges subject to a revised legislative sentencing structure and to
standards, guidelines, and review by a special division of the state
court of appeal.68' This proposal was designed specifically for the
California system and would eliminate the indeterminate sentence
as it presently operates by providing shorter ranges of possible
"5 See Percy, The Federal Corrections Reorganization Act: Blueprint for a
CriminalJustice System, 11 Am. CRIm. L. REv. 65 (1972).
88 Id.
at 72-83.
17 McGee, A New Look at Sentencing:Part i, 38 FED. PROBATION 3 (June 1974);

McGee, A New Look at Sentencing: PartII, 38 FED,. PROBATION 3 (Sept. 1974).
'" McGee, A New Look at Sentencing: Part H, 38 FED. PROBATION 7 (Sept.
1974).
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penalties (with the exception of first degree felonies) for a limited
number of offense categories, with sentencing judges fixing the
term at time of sentencing. All sentences involving institutional
confinement would be automatically followed by a period of community supervision, the length of which would be determined by
the class of sentence. All sentences involving a period of incarceration in excess of twenty-four months would be subject to automatic
appellate review and, except for life sentences, terms in excess of
four years would receive annual review after the fourth year to
determine whether earlier release should be authorized. Sentences
to incarceration of less than twenty-four months would be reviewable in the discretion of the review court upon application for an
appeal. The proposal would give the responsibility for all decisions
directly concerning the confinement or liberty of convicted felons
retaining the operational functions in
to the judicial system while
69
the executive branch.
F. Proposals for Elminating Discretion
1. Elimination of Parole
Recently the Citizens' Inquiry on Parole and Criminal Justice,
Inc. issued a report on New York Parole in which they concluded
"that parole in New York is oppressive and arbitrary, cannot fulfill
its stated goals, and is a corrupting influence within the penal
system. It should therefor be abolished.""17 The Citizens' Inquiry
did not reject indeterminate sentences entirely; rather, they recommended that sentences should be of shorter length with a narrower range of indeterminacy. They stated further that criteria
which could be properly used to determine the length of terms, and
thus justify sentences of an indeterminate nature, must await further research, but that in any event sentences should not be based
on rehabilitative purposes.," Other observers urging elimination of
parole have been appalled at the amount of discretion lodged with
parole boards and by the seeming irrationality with which that
discretion is exercised. Indeed, the McKay Commission in its
Attica Report found that of all grievances expressed by prisoners,
dissatisfaction with parole and its administration was the most
pervasive."'
" Id. at 7-11.
0 REPORT ON NEW YORK PAROLEz, supra note 90, at 290.
171Id.

I" THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMUSSION ON ATriCA, OFFIcrAL REPORT 91-
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The proposal referred to earlier' by United States District
Judge Lawrence Pierce would also eliminate parole. Short, flat
prison sentences (of four to eight months) for offenders who are
convicted of crimes that do not involve violence or acts of moral
turpitude would be followed by a fixed period of assignment to a
noncoercive program of assistance in the community. The prison
portion of the sentence would be primarily retributive and incapacitative while the community services component would represent
society's attempt to compensate for whatever skill, educational,
personal, legal, social, mental health, or other problems that might
beset the offender.'74 In specifying that the use of services offered
would be entirely voluntary, the proposal rejects the notion that
post-conviction systems should be responsible for "rehabilitating"
all of their clients. It also dispenses with discretionary release and
revocation for most offenders.
2. Sentences Fixed by Law
Rejection of the rehabilitative ideal has led some to urge that
all sentences should be fixed by law, leaving no discretion to the
sentencing judge, the correctional agency, or a parole board. The
Working Party of the American Friends Service Committee in
Struggle for Justice recommends:
From this point on (after a predetermined number of community opportunities fail to prevent law violations and the offender is delivered to the punitive agency of the state), all offenders in a broad class-such as type of crime, but not according to the unique characteristics of the individual-are to be
treated alike.
Whatever sanction or short sentence is imposed is to be
fixed by law. There is to be no discretion in setting sentences,
no indeterminate sentences, and unsupervised street release is
to replace paroleY 5
By advocating short, determinate sentences, advocates claim
that both the retributive and general deterrent purposes of criminal sanctions would be better served than under the present system and that the disparity that now characterizes sentencing
would all but be eliminated. More fundamentally, they argue that
92 (Bantam Books, 1972).
,73See text accompanying note 55 supra.
,"I Pierce, Rehabilitation in Corrections:A Reassessment, 38 FED.
3 (June 1974).
,'7 STRUGGLE FOR JUsTICE, supra note 27, 144.
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"individualized treatment," as that term is now applied, is philosophically objectionable and in operation results in wide-scale injustice.
VII.

OVERVIEW OF MAJOR EXISTING PROPOSALS

The major types of reform suggested illustrate varying levels
of dissatisfaction with the status quo and differing views concerning the nature and depth of change required. Except for the few
that contemplate fundamental changes in systems for dealing with
convicted law violators (e.g., sentences fixed by law), the reforms
suggested are addressed more toward procedure than substance.
Most of them accept the philosophical bases on which current
practices rest but would realign emphasis among the major purposes, improve the quality of information, or redistribute discretionary power. Even those who decry rehabilitative purposes and
reject a prediction of dangerousness as a basis for imposition of
sanctions continue to accept deterrence as a proper purpose and
continue to accept escalation of penalties based on prior criminality.' Such a stance seems to reflect acceptance of prediction of
future behavier and other utilitarian objectives as appropriate considerations in some instances, while rejecting them in others. Such
logical inconsistency seems to stem from deep-seated reluctance to
relinquish the notion that what is done to the few law violators who
are apprehended, convicted, sentenced, and processed through
"correctional systems" should have a dramatic impact on public
safety. "Crime in the streets" has become popularly linked to
"dangerous, repetitive criminals" and fear of the former leads to
using the latter as a means of obtaining a "solution" to national
crime problems. Despite the proven inefficacy of any devised
methods for controlling crime by the manner in which convicted
offenders are handled, there is persistent unwillingness to examine
the underlying assumptions and, hence, the alternative approaches that might be more successful. Political rhetoric only
confounds the debate by concentrating on short-term palliatives-more jails, more judges, more police-and ignoring the more
fundamental social issues and processes-income inequality, social disorganization, and so forth-that might yield long-run solutions. We are caught up in a truly vicious cycle. We have "bargained with the devil" to compromise our most basic values of
"ISee, e.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IhMRISONMENT 58-84 (1974); STRUGGLE
FOR JUSTICE, supra note 27, 48-66, 76-82, 147-48.
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individual justice and liberty in hopes of obtaining relief from
crime. When no relief is forthcoming, instead of reexamining the
bargain, we levy increasingly heavier burdens on those we are willing to sacrifice. "7 Control of crime will not follow from wreaking
inhumane suffering or attempting to coerce to virtue those who are
processed through our post-conviction systems. Continuing to
place our hopes there keeps us from devising and supporting alternative social actions and approaches that might have a real impact. It also keeps us far removed from having a criminal sanctioning system that resembles at all a "justice" system. Unpalatable
as it may sound, crime control considerations must be divorced
from the criminal sanctioning system in operation.
VIII.

NEW
SANCTIONING SYSTEMS

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR A

MODEL FOR CRIMINAL

The preceding sections of this article highlight some of the
major ills that pervade our criminal sanctioning systems. It is not
an exhaustive catalog of flaws, but those identified are basic. Most
fundamentally, the legislative branch has failed to develop and
declare a coherent public policy to govern the criminal sanctioning
process. This failure has resulted in the present state of affairs in
which the implementation of society's official responses to convicted law violators is almost totally discretionary in nature.
Where there is no clear purpose, and discretion reigns, there can
be little accountability, standards for acceptability or procedural
safeguards cannot be meaningfully enforced, and "equity" and
"justice" remain unapplied concepts. A new model for criminal
sanctioning systems is needed.
In any attempt to develop an alternative sanctioning system,
reconsideration of the purposes that the system should be designed
to serve is fundamental. It was previously suggested"' that in
trying to select a purpose or purposes on which to build a criminal
sanctioning system, it may be useful to distinguish between purposes that should apply to designing a system and those that
should apply to a particular action under that system. The proposition was advanced that utilitarian arguments are appropriate
with regard to questions about a criminal sanctioning system,
while punitive or retributive arguments fit the application of parWitness the many proposals for more mandatory extended prison terms and
capital punishment.
,71See text accompanying notes 32-60 supra.
177
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ticular rules to particular cases within that system. These suggestions were summarized by stating that in designing a criminal
sanctioning system, the focus should be on the future-on the
desired consequences for society, while in operating the system, the
focus should be on the past-on the offense for which the individual has been convicted in the instant case. Such a distinction
carries numerous implications for future sanctioning goals and
practices. A few of these will be outlined below.
If utilitarian considerations are utilized in designing a sanctioning system, an early determination will be made that the criminal law should be used with restraint. Society has an interest in
minimizing use of the criminal process because it is drastic, costly,
and productive of alienation, and because there are alternative
means for promoting and protecting societal values. Society's interests in having certain values upheld can often be met by giving
primary attention to the injured victim. Settlement, conciliation,
restitution, and similar procedures should be utilized when neither
justice nor utility warrant more dramatic exercise of state powers.
Security of private property is particularly amenable to protection
or redemption through civil rather than criminal processes. Where
there is no victim, the utilitarian concern with minimizing state
interference with an individual's life should result in removal from
the sphere of the criminal law statuses or acts such as drunkenness,
vagrancy, and other "victimless crimes" and behaviors prohibited
only for children. A utilitarian emphasis supports the view that the
power of the criminal law should be reserved to affirm, uphold, and
protect core community values that cannot be promoted effectively otherwise.
A forward-looking perspective in designing a criminal sanctioning system should also insure consideration of the consequences or effects of the sanctions selected on all individuals who
comprise the collectivity, since those who will be "offenders" under
the system cannot yet be identified. This allows a useful test to be
applied when considering various sanctioning practices for the system. The test of a suggested practice is whether every person would
be willing to accept the practice in advance of knowing what role
he or she would play. Concern would then center on a number of
questions in regard to the suggested sanctioning practice, such as
whether the innocent would be harmed, whether burdens and privileges would be apportioned evenly, whether the practice would be
cruel, degrading, or inhumane, or whether some less drastic practice would serve as well. Thus, a utilitarian approach in designing
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a system of sanctions should lead to concern with justice, fairness,
and acceptability of the sanctioning practices proposed.
Once a system of criminal laws and sanctions has been designed, the orientation must change. Utilitarian considerations are
inappropriate to the day-to-day operation of the system. Sanctions
should be imposed on the basis of "just deserts," rather than on
any presumed potential for future criminality on the part of the
individual being sentenced or of others. It is unjust to deprive a
person of liberty or otherwise enhance a penalty on the basis of
something that has not occurred. Crime control considerations
should play no role in the assignment of a sanction to a given
offender for a particular offense. This orientation bears a number
of ramifications that may be self-evident but that deserve brief
explication, since they represent a dramatic departure from the
status quo.
To say that the imposition of criminal sanctions should not be
tied to predictions about the future or attempts to alter the future
means that rehabilitative, incapacitative, and deterrent motives
should not be allowed to influence the sanction. State intervention
in individual lives through the criminal law should be stayed until
some harm has been caused by a responsible actor, regardless of
the potential for future harm. Criminal penalties should be definite, precluding extension or other alteration no matter how
strongly preventive principles indicate the likelihood of another
crime. Sanctions should be proportional to the offense, precluding
adjustment to fit the presumed rehabilitative needs of the offender
or society's presumed needs for protection.
A number of existing sanctioning practices do not satisfy these
criteria. If a sanction is to be based on what is deserved for the
instant crime, prior convictions and sanctions should have no effect. Statutes based on the concepts of "habitual," "persistent,"
"professional," or "dangerous" offenders or sentencing criteria
that rely on past, already punished, criminality should be disallowed. If sanctions are to be final and definite, allegations of subsequent criminal acts, or of behaviors or attitudes thought to lead to
crime, should not be allowed to effect the sanction for the instant
offense for which the individual has been duly convicted. Thus,
probation, parole, and other "conditional" sanctions, as presently
conceived and operated, should be eliminated. Furthermore, if all
vestiges of desire to obtain reduction of crime by physically restraining, or making the offender suffer because of a presumed
deterrent effect on others, or "curing" those held captive, are to be
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removed from the sanction selection process, the only remaining
justification for use of incarceration as a sanction would be if such
deprivation of liberty were viewed as the precisely appropriate way
of expressing the most severe disapproval of the most severe of
crimes. It seems unlikely that such a costly, dehumanizing, criminogenic practice would be heavily relied upon as a sanction if all
preventive objectives were absent.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge to be faced, were such a
new criminal sanctioning system to be developed, would be the
operationalization of the concept of "just deserts." Most debate as
to differing sanctions has focused on questions of length of terms
and of incarceration versus non-incarceration from a utilitarian
and preventive perspective. Most presently operating sanctions
other than incarceration were designed to serve rehabilitative
objectives. There is little precedent or expression of public sentiment in regard to sanctions such as monetary payments to victims,
public service requirements, or purely punitive restrictions or penalties. Thus, development of a set of sanctions of varying form or
nature for a system based on the principles set forth herein will be
a formidable undertaking. The task of grading offenses according
to relative severity or harm done and structuring sanctions proportional thereto will require difficult judgments and imagination.
Many of the propositions and implications suggested here will
undoubtedly be met with resistance. The American public tends
to maintain a tenacious belief in the ability of the state to conquer
any social problem and in the inherent "rightness" of attempting
to do so, particularly when appropriate balancing tests among
competing values and objectives are infrequently raised. The assertion that post-conviction sanctions should be designed and
administered to maximize individual liberty and justice necessarily requires abandoning reliance on many present practices ostensibly designed to reduce crime. However, in one sense a sanctioning system based on the premises suggested herein may do more
to develop socially responsible citizens than any therapeutic approach could. A conception of the offender as volitional with responsibility for his or her behavior allows the growth of the individual's capacity for effectual and responsible decision. "Man learns
wisdom in choosing by being confronted with choices and by being
made aware that he must abide the consequences of his choice.
[I]t is the criminal law which defines the minimum condi-
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tions of man's responsibility to his fellows and holds him to that
responsibility."17
171

Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 410

(1966).
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